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ADEQUACY OF DOMESTIC AIRLINE SERVICE: THE
COMMUNITY'S ROLE IN A CHANGING INDUSTRY*
To realize its full economic potential, a city must secure air service which
keeps pace with community expansion.' But the frequency and quality of
available air transportation have deteriorated substantially in many of the
nation's cities, 2 as airlines have pursued the relatively large profits attending
long-haul flights between major population centers.3 The trend toward cur-
tailed operations in smaller communities is certain to become still more pro-
*In early 1959, the Yale Law Journal received replies to a questionnaire sent to the
chambers of commerce of seventy cities. The questionnaire was designed to elicit infor-
mation concerning the economic characteristics of a community, the adequacy of its trans-
portation, and local efforts to improve air service. Material obtained in this manner, to-
gether with covering letters from city officials, is hereinafter cited as QUESTioNNAIRE.
The questionnaire and a list of the cities responding are set forth in the Appendix, pp.
1243-44 infra.
1. Air commerce now occupies a leading position among the nation's transportation
systems. STAFF OF SuBcomm. No. 5, HousE COmm. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 85TH CONG., IST
SESs., REPORT ON AnR.INEs 7 (Comm. Print 1957) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON Am-
LINEs]. In 1957, domestic intercity passenger miles of air travel exceeded total intercity
rail transport (Pullman and coach combined), and comprised 40.5% of total passenger
traffic by common carrier. 1958 OAA STATisTicAL HANDBOOK 70.
This Comment is exclusively concerned with domestic passenger service. For discus-
sions of the air-freight industry, see THOMAS, EcoNoMic REGULATION OF ScHEDU.iED Am
TRANSPORT 106-11 (1951) [hereinafter cited as THOMAS]; REPORT ON AmrINEs 24-27,
163-79; Symposium-Air Cargo, 15 LAw & CoTEmrP. PROD. 1 (1950). And for an anal-
ysis of international air transportation, see REPoRT ON A=ni-Es 33-43, 217-64; THOMAS
ch. 4; Bebchick, The International Air Transport Association and the Civil Aeronautics
Board, 25 J. AIR L. & Com. 8 (1958); Calkins, The Role of the Civil Aeronautics Board
in the Grant of Operating Rights it Foreign Air Carriage, 22 3. Am L. & Com. 253
(1955).
Nonscheduled carriers are not treated in this Comment, except that their relationship
to the adequacy-of-service problem is analyzed in note 73 infra.
2. Of the seventy cities responding to the Journal Questionnaire, only twenty-four
stated that airline service was adequate. No pattern was apparent, the dissatisfied cities
being diverse in terms of geographic location, economic significance, and population.
3. See FammcKc, COmmERcIAL Am TRANsPoRrATiON 407-08 (rev. ed. 1947) [here-
inafter cited as FREERICK] ; Seven States Area Investigation, 1A Av. L. REP. 1f 22226,
at 14323-24 (CAB Dec. 8, 1958); OGEuRN, THE SocIAL EFFmcrs OF AvIAToN 222-27
(1946).
According to an airport official who has devoted most of his professional life to the
development of aviation:
In the area generally east of the Mississippi a mad scramble has been on for
the past ten years among our main trunk lines to haul passengers in million dollar
equipment, usually non, or one stop between the terminal points . . . at reduced
fares, while the inland cities in between get very little consideration either by the
[Civil Aeronautics Board] or the airlines for either commuter first class (full
fare), coach or reduced fare service. Yet, the airlines yell for "new markets", and,
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nounced with the use of jet aircraft. 4 Indeed, charges have already been made
that some airlines deliberately furnish poor service at their less-lucrative stops,
then request permission to suspend flights because traffic demand is inade-
quate. 5
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (Federal Aviation Act of 1958) 0 au-
thorized the Civil Aeronautics Board to allocate available carrier resources
among the nation's cities through the certification of new routes 7 and the
enforcement of an "adequate service" standard. 8 At present, CAB decisions.
subject only to judicial review, establish which cities are to receive air ser-
vice and what operations are locally required. Since air transportation is but
one facet of municipal development, the Board may lack the necessary per-
spective to determine a community's economic needs.9 Absent, however, a fed-
eral agency responsible for coordinating national transportation policy,10 or
however, their sales departments and schedulings have done little to promote the
vast new markets which are flown over every day.
QUESTIONNAIRE.
Another airport manager reported that "the medium size community (200,000 to 500,000
population) has the most serious legitimate complaint. Particularly those communities
located within 75 to 100 miles of a major airport . . . [for they do not] receive the
service [they] can and will support." Ibid.
4. Cline, Airline Scheduling, Route Patterns and Sales, 23 J. AIR L. & Com. 164
(1956) (jet-carrier route segments should be longer than 500 miles, preferably 750 to
1000 miles; in order to exploit the speed of jet aircraft, time spent at intermediate stations
must be eliminated 'by overflying communities lying between large terminal points).
5. QUESTIONNAIRE. One eastern airport official claims that the underlying reason for
poor trunkline service is the airlines' belief that no loss of revenue will result because
passengers will use surface transportation or local air service to nearby major airports.
Trunk carriers are attempting to suspend service where presently authorized at
medium size communities and they are using the old familiar method. Provide the
poorest service possible, do not sell or merchandise what little is provided and
when traffic declines, petition for suspension of service with the suggestion that a
local service carrier be certificated in its place. They then make certain that re-
strictions be placed on the local carrier's certificate to insure that the passenger
is forced to go to the nearby major airport for airline service.
Ibid.
6. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 [hereinafter referred to as
"the act"; sections of the act will be cited as they appear in the Statutes at Large]. Thc
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1542 ('Supp. 1958), re-
placed the 1938 act on December 31, 1958, but made little or no substantive change in
the statutory provisions discussed in this Comment. Since the material utilized in this
Comment is geared entirely to the 1938 act, that act's section numbers will be cited.
Whenever the Federal Aviation Act uses a different section number, this number will be
indicated in parentheses; e.g., § 2 of the act (now § 102).
7. See notes 19-38 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 139-55 infra and accompanying text.
9. See statement by Wilfred Owan in NATIONAL RESOURCE PLANNI-G BOARD, TRANS-
PORTATION AND NATIONAL POLICY 254-55 (1942).
10. The federal government once attempted to formulate a national transportati,,n
plan by establishing the Federal Coordinator of Transportation. The experiment did nut
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a body charged with formulating a national plan for urban development,"
the interaction of air service and city growth will doubtless remain exclusively
within the original jurisdiction of the CAB. Hence, the Board will continue
to be responsible for using its certification and "adequate service" powers to
correct local inadequacies.
In discharging its functions, the Board may initiate proceedings against any
carrier which provides a community with unsatisfactory service, or, within
limits, may require an airline to undertake operations in a new locality.'
2
Aggressive community action is usually necessary to precipitate CAB inter-
vention, however.'3 Alternatively, municipal officials may approach carriers
directly and ask them to cooperate in efforts to obtain or improve service-
though airlines are often uninterested in any profit potential less than that
available in the major market areas. 14 The possible participants in a contest
for airline service are therefore three-the CAB, a carrier, and a city demand-
ing increased air transportation.
THE PARTICIPANTS
The Civil Aeronautics Board
Though vested with extensive regulatory authority,15 the CAB has volun-
tarily confined its control over service deficiencies to certifying new carriers
prove successful, and the office was abolished in 1936. See McDOuGAL & HABER, PROP-
ERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 1162 (1948). See
generally Pegrum, The Special Problem of Inter-Agency Competition in Transport, 24
I.C.C. PRAc. J. 307 (1956).
11. The federal government's only effort to propound an urban development policy
is contained in NATIONAL REsouRcEs CoMm., OuR CITIEs: THEIR ROLE IN THE NATIONAL
EcoNomY (1937). The National Resources Committee was abolished in 1944.
12. Section 1002(b) of the act authorized the Board to investigate carrier compliance
with the act's provisions; § 1002(c) authorized the Board to enter compliance orders
against dilatory carriers.
Under § 401(h) (now § 401(g)), the Board on its own initiative may modify or alter
a carrier's certificate so as to provide service to a hitherto unscheduled point. See notes
103-05 infra and accompanying text.
13. On its own initiative, the Board has undertaken only one investigation of carrier
compliance with the adequacy requirement. See Investigation of Coach-Type Service in
Certain New York Markets, No. 9973, CAB, 1959, discussed note 124 infra. The initial
decision of the hearing examiner is pending.
14. See Seven States Area Investigation, IA Av. L. REP. f 22226 (CAB Dec. 8,
1958), discussed notes 116-19 infra and accompanying text; Service to Ely, Nevada, Av.
L. REP. (1954-57 CAB Cas.) ff 21812 (1955), discussed notes 109-15 infra and accom-
panying text.
15. The Board issues the certificates of public convenience and necessity which are
prerequisites to engaging in air transportation; grants the necessary permits to foreign
air carriers; makes modifications, alterations, suspensions or revocations of such certifi-
cates and permits; establishes rates and tariffs; supervises the transportation of mail;
requires elaborate reporting and accounting procedures by air carriers; controls mergers
between air carriers, other mergers affecting air commerce, and interlocking directorates;
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and passing on proposed extensions to already existent routes.16 Under the
Civil Aeronautics Act's "grandfather clause," certificates were automatically
issued airlines for their routes in operation at the time the statute was en-
acted.1 7 In every other case, a route application is not approved unless it
meets certain statutory prerequisites.'
8
When processing applications for certification, the CAB applies a series of
tests derived from the broad policy statements in section 2 (now section 102)
of the act,' 9 and from the requirement in section 401 (d) (1) that transporta-
tion be for the "public convenience and necessity. '20 Proposed service must
and supervises business practices and methods of competition within the industry. REPORT
oiN AnuiNEs 48-53. On the regulatory authority of the CAB, see generally THOmAS
ch. 3; PUFFE, Am TRANSPORTATION 256-609 (1941) [hereinafter cited as PUFa]. On
supplementary government controls over aviation, see PUFFER 610-37; REPORT ON AR-
LINES 60-67. On the residual regulatory authority of the states over air commerce, see
54 MicH. L. REV. 998 (1.956) ; 7 Sw. L.J. 293 (1953).
16. Under §§ 1002(b) and 1002(c), the CAB has power to investigate compliance
with the provisions of the act and to enter appropriate orders. But the Board has never
issued a compliance order on account of inadequate service, though pending cases may
result in such action for the first time. See notes 125-33, 155 infra and accompanying
text. But see Continental Air Lines, Inc., Additional Air Service in Texas, 4 C.A.B. 215,
239 (1943) (if inadequate existent service proved, CAB would issue compliance orders
under § 404(a) ("adequate service") rather than authorize new-carrier service) (dictum).
17. Section 401 (e) of the act. This section was repealed by the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301. (Supp. 1958), as now superfluous. See
PUFRm 110-38; THOMAS 54-66, 56 n.41 (citing cases involving the issuance of "grand-
father" certificates) ; Rhyne, The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and Grandfather Ccrtifi-
cates, 12 AIR L. REv. 245 (1941).
The "grandfather" clause required automatic certification "unless the service rendered
by [the] . .. applicant . . . was inadequate and inefficient. . . ." § 401(e) (1). Leading
cases discussing the adequacy requirements under the provision include: Panama Air-
ways, Inc., 2 C.A.B. 124, 129-30 (1940); Marquette Airlines, Inc., 1 C.A.A. 301, 307
(1939) ; Airline Feeder System, 1 C.A.A. 167, 169 (1939).
For a discussion of the "little grandfather clause" enacted in 1955, see note 70 infra.
18. Section 401 of the act. For an analysis of the process for issuing new certificates,
see PUFFER 138-57. In certain instances, a carrier may be permitted to operate without
a certificate under the exemption provisions of the act, §§ 1(2) (now § 101(3)) and
416(b). See note 73 infra. The Board may also issue temporary certificates for a limited
period of time under § 401 (d) (2). See Seven States Area Investigation, IA Av. L. REP.
ff 22226, at 14297 (CAB Dec. 8, 1953) (temporary certificate given so Board will have
opportunity to appraise competitive effect of service); Los Angeles Airways Renewal
Case, 1A Av. L. REP. ff 22190 (CAB July 28, 1958) (experimental nature of operations
warrants more direct method of control such as that provided by temporary certificate).
19. Under § 2 (now § 102), the Board is to consider the following as "being in the
public interest" and in accord with the "public convenience and necessity": the encourage-
ment and development of an air transportation system; the needs of the public, the Post
Office and the national defense; fostering sound economic conditions in the industry; the
promotion of adequate, economical and efficient service; competition to the extent neces-
sary to ensure the sound development of the industry; and the promotion of air safety.
20. The leading case articulating the factors constituting public convenience and
necessity under § 401(d) (.1) is Northwest Airlines, Inc., 1 C.A.A. 573 (1940). There,
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correspond to a public need ;21 and every carrier must be "fit, willing and
able to perform. '22 More precise standards are also invoked in accordance
with the nature of the contemplated operations.2 If an applicant seeks to be-
come the first carrier over a given route, sufficient evidence of traffic potential
must be adduced to warrant the route's authorization.2 4 If transportation is
already being provided along the route sought, there are additional determi-
nants: Can existing carriers meet the traffic demand satisfactorily ?25 If so,
the Board stated that the primary considerations are whether the new service will serve
a useful public purpose responsive to the public need; whether this purpose can and will
be adequately served by the applicant without impairing the operations of existing car-
riers contrary to the public interest; and whether the cost of the proposed service to the
Government will be outweighed by the benefit which will accrue to the public. See also
Eastern Air Lines, Inc.-Memphis-Greenville Operations, 4 C.A.B. 429 (1943) (Board
must consider the relationship that a new route would bear to a nationally adequate and
economically sound air transportation system, the needs of the particular system, and the
needs of the particular communities to be served).
21. United Airlines Transp. Corp., 1 C.A.A. 778, 780 (1940). See THOMAs 73-79;
National Airlines, 1 C.A.A. 612 (1940) (Board must ensure against the inauguration of
service in excess of requirements of the area affected in order that an uneconomical bur-
den will not be placed upon the development of air transportation and upon the Govern-
ment). In determining the need for service, the Board considers, among other things,
population, commercial importance, economic characteristics, rail service, distance to be
traveled in order to obtain air transportation, and comparative air service in cities of
similar location, population, and economic importance. See United Airlines Transp. Corp.,
2 C.A.B. 543 (1941). A community of interest and trade relationship among cities to be
served along a proposed route must also be demonstrated. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 8 C.A.B. 487, 493-94 (1947) ; Northwest Airlines, Inc., 1 C.A.A. 573, 581. (1940).
22. ISection 401(d) (1) of the act. See generally THOMAs 67-68. This standard re-
quires adequate capital, a qualified organization, technical knowledge of aircraft opera-
tion, familiarity with problems involved in common carrier transportation, and capability
to operate efficiently and economically. Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B.
857, 899-900 (1946). Moreover, the applicant must have a service plan made by competent
personnel, see Braniff Airways, Inc. v. GAB, 147 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1945), and must
be willing to comply with the provisions of the act, New York-Florida Case, Av. L. REP.
(1954-57 CAB Cas.) 1r21993, at 14761 (1956). See also Pan American Airways, Inc., 1
C.A.A. 695, 711 (1940) (in ascertaining fitness and ability, the then primary determinants
were competency and financial ability of the applicant carrier). For further discussion of
the requirement that an applicant be "willing" to perform, see note 104 infra and accom-
panying text.
23. See Pan American Airways, Inc., 11 C.A.B. 852, 925 (1950).
24. Continental Airlines, Inc., 1 C.A.A. 598 (1940). In considering the need for
service, the Board does not normally confine investigation to data relating only to the
city limits of the community to be served, but examines instead the entire traffic-generat-
ing area which would be served through the same airport. Reopened Charleston-Colum-
bus Case, IA Av. L. REP. ff 22153, at 14061-62 (CAB Jan. 16, 1958). See OGBuRN, THE
SOCIAL EFFECTs OF AVIATION 220-21. (1946) (suggesting a twenty-five mile radius test).
The first carrier to operate over a given route is said to provide "first-carrier ser-
vice."
25. See United Airlines Transp. Corp., 1 C.A.A. 778, 780 (1940) ; National Airlines,
Inc., 1 C.A.A. 612, 624 (1940). See also New York-Florida Case, Av. L. REP. (1954-57 CAB
Cas.) ff 21993, at 14755 (1956) (additional carrier authorized because "the present short-
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can the applicant introduce other reasons (such as the inability of present
carriers to develop the route seasonably) sufficient to justify certification ?20
Even if existing lines could serve an expanding market effectively, the CAB
might still conclude that the sound development of the air transport system
requires another carrier in order to promote competition.2 7 Before creating
or increasing competitive service, the Board makes certain that the revised
market structure will produce a more effective pattern of air service without
unnecessarily duplicating transport facilities. 28 A more important economic
consideration is the extent to which increased competition will fragmentize
total market traffic among several airlines.29 On the one hand, if the carriers
presently serving the area are not financially self-sufficient, the sudden inter-
jection of a new competitor might necessitate an increase in their level of
subsidy."0 On the other, if the applicant cannot profitably undertake the pro-
posed route extension, the cost to him may also have to be absorbed (total-
ly or partially) by subsidization. 31 Consequently, authorization hinges on
comings in service have been shown to exist over a substantial period of time, and the
existing carriers have not demonstrated their ability to overcome them").
26. ISee Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.'A.B. 857, 888 (1946) (services of
additional carrier warranted because serving airlines would not fully develop traffic poten-
tial.) See also Great Lakes-Southeast Serv. Case, No. 2396, CAB, Sept. 30, 1958, pp. 14-
15 (overall development of transportation will be fostered by adding third carrier to the
market even though services of existing carriers not legally inadequate).
27. See § 2(d) of the act (now § 102(d)). Recently, the Board had made it clear
that the benefits of competitive air service will not be withheld from the traveling public
merely because existing carriers are rendering "adequate service." Tucson Airport Au-
thority, Av. L. REP. (1954-57 CAB Cas.) ff 21977, at 14702 (1956). See Maclay & Burt,
Entry of New Carriers Into Domestic Trunkline Air Transportation, 22 J. AIR L. &
Com. 131, 140 n.25 (1955) (citing cases). Cf. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346
U.S. 86, 94 (1953) (competition is relevant in weighing the public interest). See general-
ly KEvFs, FEDERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AIR TRANSPORTATION (1951).
The Board has denied the application of a carrier unable to provide the needed com-
petitive service. Denver Service Case, Av. L. REP. (1954-57 CAB Cas.) ff 21877, at 14439
(1955).
28. See Service in the Rocky Mountain States Area, 6 C.A.B. 695, 740 (1946) (dup-
lication warranted only if incidental to other operations throughout the area) ; West Coast
Case, 6 C.A.B. 961 (1946) (traffic potential not sufficient to justify authorization of route
that would constitute substantial duplication of existing operations) ; New England Case,
7 C.A.B. 27 (1946) (duplication merited where competing carriers would provide essen-
tially different services).
29. See THoMsAs 79-81 (also collecting cases). The diversionary impact on an exist-
ing carrier must seriously affect its financial position in order to justify withholding the
authorization of needed competitive service. Great Lakes-Southeast Serv. Case, IA Av.
L. REP. ff 22211, at 14222-23 (,CAB Sept. 30, 1958) ; United Airlines Transp. Corp., 1
C.A.A. 778, 780 (1940).
30. See Delta Air Corp., 2 C.A.B. 447, 493 (1941) (because traffic diversion occa-
sioned by new carrier would result in needed increase of subsidy to established carrier,
authorization denied).
31. See Northwest Airlines, Inc., 2 C.A.B. 627, 651 (1941) (services of additional
carrier would require government financial support; application denied).
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whether, in terms of section 2's policy standards, the benefit accruing to the
public warrants the cost to the Government.32
Once the Board concludes that the services of an additional carrier are
justified, the problem of selecting an entrant from among two or more appli-
cants may arise.33 To gain approval, an airline must be physically equipped
to provide effective competition for existing lines.34 Often, the CAB will also
require that an applicant have a history of serving the relevant area,35 and
that the proposed route extension be in harmony with the applicant's existing
route structure. 36 A grant of certificated authority must enhance rather than
distort the competitive balance within the industry.37 And, if two or more
lines are otherwise equally qualified, the Board will consider any differences
in their prospective subsidy levels.
38
32. See Northwest Airlines, Inc., 1 C.A.A. 573, 578-79 (1941). For general discussions,
see KEYEs, FEDERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AIR TRANSPORTATION ch. 8 (1951); GILL
& BATES, AIRLINE Co mPEITION 479-504 (1949) [hereinafter cited as GILL & BATES];
THOMAS 95-100; Gellman, The Regulation of Competition in. United States Domestic
Air Transportation: A Judicial Survey and Analysis, 24 J. AIR L. & Coas. 410, 417-34
(1957).
Another important determinant in all authorization proceedings is whether the pro-
posed route comports with the existent pattern of national air transportation. Pennsyl-
vania Cent. Airlines, Inc., 1 C.A.A. 811, 816 (1940) ; see PuFFER 142.
33. See THOMAS 81-84; Westwood, Choice of the Air Carrier for New Air Trans-
port Routes, 16 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 159 (1947=1948).
Under the broad doctrine announced in Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 US. 327
(1945) (a case concerned with the granting of radio licenses), the CAB must consider
all mutually exclusive applications for route certificates before an award can be made.
See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 228 F.2d 17, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (collecting cases at
n.6); Note, 44 VA. L. REv. 1147 (1958).
34. See Great Lakes-Southeast Serv. Case, IA Av. L. REP. 1 22211, at 14225 (,CAB
Sept. 30, 1958) (Delta and Northwest favored over Capitol Airways because better able
to use larger and more modern aircraft on authorized routes).
35. See, e.g., id. at 14225; Denver Serv. Case, Av. L. REP. (1954-57 CAB Cas.)
121877, at 14434 (1955).
36. 'Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., 6 C.A.B. 253, 262-63 (1945). In the Great Lakes-
Southeast Serv. Case, 1A Av. L. REP. 11 22211, at 14223 (CAB Sept. 30, 1958), Northwest
rather than National was authorized to serve the Chicago-Miami market because the
route extension would be supported by traffic from cities beyond Chicago that Northwest
was presently serving. National, on the other hand, would have had to depend solely on
passengers enplaning and deplaning in Chicago, since its route structure did not extend
any farther north or west.
37. Southwest-Northeast Serv. Case, Av. L. REP. (1954-57 CAB Cas.) f[ 21892, at
14491 (1955) ("It is vital . . . to so develop the national air route structure as to tend
to decrease rather than increase the gap between the relative size of the Big Four carriers
and the smaller trunks.") ; see Great Lakes-Southeast Serv. Case, JA Av. L. REP. 122211,
at 14223, 14226 (CAB Sept. 30, 1958) (Capital Airlines chosen to serve Buffalo-Florida
markets because it would add strength to the carrier's system and improve its financial
position); Taaffe, A Map Analysis of United States Airline Competition, 25 J. AIR L.
& Com. 121, 146 (1958). See 1956 CAB ANN. REP. 1.
38. Gellman, supra note 32, at 424. See also Great Lakes-Southeast Serv. Case, supra
nute 37. Of course, decreased subsidy may not be compatible with the Board's policy of
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Carrier Autonomy
Though a carrier which has been authorized to operate over a designated
route must comply with certain statutory obligations, it has almost complete
dominion over the conduct of its operations. The act requires only that trans-
portation be made available upon a reasonable request; that safe and adequate
service, facilities and equipment be furnished; that carriers coordinate their
through-flight scheduling; and that the airlines refrain from granting either
an undue preference or unreasonable advantage to any particular person, port,
locality or type of traffic.39 In addition, the Board has authority to impose
other reasonable terms, conditions, or limitations if the public interest so re-
quires.40 But nothing in a certificate may impair the carrier's right to "add
to or change schedules, equipment, accommodations, and facilities." 41 Hence,
an airline may institute changes in its schedule pattern upon giving simulta-
neous notice to the Board.4 While this practice can effectively relegate a car-
enhancing the industry's competitive structure, see note 37 supra, in which case the latter
consideration prevails, Gellman, supra at 424.
39. Section 404(a) provides in part:
It shall be the duty of every air carrier to provide and furnish interstate and over-
seas air transportation, as authorized by its certificate, upon reasonable request
therefor and to provide reasonable through service in such air transportation in
connection with other air carriers; to provide safe and adequate service ...
Section 404(b) provides:
No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any undue or un-
reasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, port, locality, or de-
scription of traffic in air transportation in any respect whatsoever or subject any
particular person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation to
any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage
in any respect whatsoever.
40. Section 401(f) of the act (now § 401(e)). In the Great Lakes-Southeast Serv.
Case, 1A Av. L. REP. 11 22211, at 14223, 14229-30 (CAB Sept. 30, 1958), the CAB re-
quired Capital Airlines to make long-haul flights in order to prevent the carrier from
concentrating service in a short-haul local market to the detriment of the established local-
service carriers. Typically, restrictions of this type take the form of permitting service
between a particular pair of points only on flights originating or terminating at a distant
community. See also Tucson Airport Authority, Av. L. REP. (1954-57 CAB Cas.) 11 21977,
at 14703-04 (1956) (prohibition of purely local traffic service); Seven States Area In-
vestigation, 1A Av. L. REP. 1 22226, at 14322-24 (CAB Dec. 8, 1958) (preclusion of
nonstop service) ; cf. Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation, No. 5132, CAB, Jan. 28,
1959, pp. 7-16 (restriction on number of flights flown per month by "supplemental" car-
riers). The certificate specifies the terminal and intermediate points between which the
carrier is authorized to operate, § 401(f) (now § 401(e)), and the type of service-mail,
freight or passenger-to be rendered.
41. The fourth sentence of section 401(f) of the act (now § 401(e)) provides that
"no term, condition, or limitation of a certificate shall restrict the right of an air car-
rier to add to or change schedules, equipment, accommodations, and facilities for perform-
ing the authorized transportation and service as the development of the business and the
demands of the public shall require."
42. CAB Econ. Reg., 14 C.F.R. § 231.5(c) (1956). If the schedule change affects
the carriage of mail, the carrier must give ten days notice to the Postmaster General, and,
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rier's smaller stops to aerial obscurity, the statute allows an airline virtual
autonomy over the scheduling of its flights.
In theory, the CAB has extensive statutory powers to rectify the service
deficiencies of existing carriers; in practice, the Board exercises only nominal
control. After investigation, the Board may issue an order to compel a dilatory
carrier to comply with its "adequate service" obligation, but this prerogative
has not been exercised.43 Moreover, an airline's failure to initiate flights after
reasonable request by a community does not work an automatic forfeiture of
its certificate; instead, the CAB may investigate at its discretion to determine
whether revocation would be in the public interest.44 The optional feature of
this provision has impaired its efficacy. 45 The airlines' freedom in initiating
service is evidenced by the fact that, although 590 cities appear on domestic
route certificates, only 549 are presently receiving air transportation." Fur-
thermore, an airline which is dissatisfied with operations at a particular com-
munity may obtain CAB permission to suspend service there-and often with-
out having to subject its request to a formal hearing. 47 Similarly, if a certifi-
unless he disapproves, may institute the change See § 405(e) of the act (now § 405 (b))
and CAB Econ. Reg., 14 C.F.R. § 231.5(b) (1.956).
43. Sections 1002(b) and (c) of the act. The Board early recognized that it had
statutory authority to compel the airlines to give "adequate service" to points authorized
to receive service. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 1 C.A.A. 723 (1940). But the Board
has yet to issue an order compelling a carrier to comply with the § 404(a) "adequate
service" standard. The Board did "informally" order a carrier to increase service in the
Niagara Falls Airport Case, 18 C.A.B. 693, 694 (1954). The hearing examiner had held
that the service being provided by American Airlines at Niagara Falls was inadequate.
The Board, affirming, stated that if the carrier did not improve its schedule pattern, the
city could raise the question of compelling additional service in a new proceeding under
§ 404 of the act. In the first adequacy case under § 404(a), Fort Worth Investigation,
1A Av. L. REP. 11 22205 (CAB Sept. 23, 1958), discussed notes 139-72 infra and accom-
panying text, the Board deemed existing service adequate and refused to order an in-
crease in operations. Pending cases, however, may bring about a modification of Fort
Worth. See notes 125-33, 155 infra and accompanying text.
44. "[I]f any service authorized by a certificate is not inaugurated... the Authority
may by order, entered after notice and hearing, direct that such certificate shall there-
upon cease to be effective to the extent of such service." Section 401(g) of the act (now
§ 401 (f)).
45. There have been but three cases in which a carrier's certificate was revoked be-
cause of a failure to inaugurate service. See Northern Cross, Inc., Certificate Nullifica-
tion, 11 C.A.B. 673 (1950); Parks Investigation Case, 11 C.A.B. 779 (1950); Tri-State
Aviation Corp., Revocation of Certificate, 4 C.A.B. 100 (1943).
46. 1958 CAA STATISTICAL HANDBOOK 62. This figure includes cities which are re-
ceiving service from some but not all locally authorized carriers.
47. While § 401(k) of the act (now § 401(j)) requires the CAB to hold a hearing
prior to "abandonment," the CAB Econ. Reg., 14 C.F.R. § 205 (1956), provides for a
"temporary suspension" by board order alone. The distinction has become somewhat
blurred. "Although from the standpoint of potential users of service the end result of
abandonment, suspension, or revocation may be exactly the same, i.e., loss of service, these
three are not necessarily the same. Abandonment and revocation both have the attribute
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cate-holder prefers to serve a city through a different airport, it may divert
its flights thirty days after notifying the Board of the proposed shift, provided
the CAB has not issued a restraining order.48 Hence, unless the CAB decides
that the public interest will be harmed, a carrier may institute a changeover
without formal approval.49 Also, if a carrier wishes to commence nonstop,
long-haul service between two cities which are on its route but are not con-
secutively named in its certificate, it may do so upon notice to the Board.5 "
In short, the act affords the certificated carriers substantial flexibility in pro-
viding air transportation, and allows managerial rather than administrative
decisions to govern service operations.5 1
The Industry
Deeming a commercial air fleet vital to both the economy and national
defense, Congress has guarded the airline industry's interests and guaranteed
a reasonable profit to any prudently managed carrier serving a needed route.5
of finality, while suspension permits possible return to the original status." All American
Airways, Inc., Suspension Case, 10 C.A.B. 24, 27 (1949). (Emphasis added.) "Returns
to the original status" are rare. Also, the CAB may suspend service on its own initiative
under § 401(h) of the act. See North Central Route Investigation Case, 14 C.A.B. 1027,
1050-52 (1951). Scheduling freedom is further enhanced by allowing the carriers to sus-
pend service without either application or order if they have never inaugurated regular
service at a given point. CAB Econ. Reg., 14 C.F.R. § 205.6 (1956).
48. CAB Econ. Reg., 14 C.F.R. § 202.3 (1956).
49. See Service to Springfield, Mass., 11 C.A.B. 747 (1950) (airport transfer re-
quired by public interest).
50. CAB Econ. Reg., 14 C.F.R. § 202.2 (1956). Nonstop service may be instituted
upon the effective date of a schedule page filed with the Board if the carrier's certificate
does not preclude such service. See note 40 supra. Also, nonstop service on flights carry-
ing mail may not be inaugurated unless the Postmaster General approves. See note 42
supra.
51. The Board has stated that the purpose of preventing it from restricting schedule
changes "is to help delineate the respective spheres of the carriers and the Board in order
to assure to each certificated carrier the managerial freedom to conduct its operations
within the scope of its authority at its own discretion or judgment without the impediment
of regulatory restrictions in its certificate in the respects indicated." Large Irregular Air
Carrier Investigation, No. 5132, CAB, Jan. 28, 1.959, p. 8. The Board has required
adherence to published schedules, however. In 1957, the CAB stipulated that domestic
certificated carriers must complete at least 75% of all flights within fifteen minutes of
the time shown in their schedules. 42 C.F.R. § 234.4 (Supp. 1959). Any failure to com-
ply with this regulation during a three-month period is a violation of the holder's certifi-
cate unless noncompliance is justified by circumstances beyond the carrier's control. 1957
CAB ANN. REP. 1S. To date, no proceedings have occurred under this order.
52. In fixing and determining fair and reasonable rates of compensation under this
section, the Authority .. . shall take into consideration ... the need of each such
carrier for compensation for the transportation of mail sufficient to insure the per-
formance of such service, and, together with all other revenue of the air carrier,
to enable such air carrier under honest, economical, and efficient management, to
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The growth of air commerce has been protectively nurtured,53 and the indus-
try has long been proffered the teat of subsidy. Before World War II, fed-
eral encouragement was confined solely to the trunkline carriers providing
passenger service between major commercial centers.5 4 Their dominance over
the air market was maintained by the automatic-certification ("grandfather")
clause of the Civil Aeronautics Act.55 After the war, the bulk of subsidy pay-
ments went to non-trunklines, while trunk carriers made tremendous advances
toward their goal of economic self-sufficiency.50 Since 1957, in fact, none of
maintain and continue the development of air transportation to the extent and of
the character and quality required for the commerce of the United States, the
Postal Service, and the national defense.
Section 406(b) of the act. Subsidy payments guarantee the airlines that, so long as they
are soundly managed, the United States will underwrite their business. See REPORT ON
AIR.INES 16 & n.34. For general discussions, see Gifford, The Evolution of Air Mail
Rate Making, 22 J. Am L. & Co-nf. 298 (1955); O'Connell, Air Mail Pay Under the
Civil Aeronautics Act, 25 IND. L.J. 27 (1949) ; Comment, 55 CoLum. L. REv. 933 (1955).
53. The lure of controlled competition and chronic financial difficulties during the
aviation industry's formative years led representatives of both the scheduled airlines and
the industry's trade group, the Air Transport Association, to assume a prominent role
in securing government controls. REPORT oN AIRLINES 2, 13-14. See the testimony of
Edgar S. Gorrell, Air Transport Association, Hearings on H.R. 5234, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 66 (1937). The established subsidized carriers feared that a new firm would begin
competition with used equipment and low costs, and that the ensuing rate wars would
bring disaster or near-disaster. PUFFER 52. "A large part of the demand for regulation
has come from the industry itself." Id. at 57. Prior to 1938, it was estimated that half
of the $120 million invested in the industry had been lost. Altschul, Economic Regulation
of Air Transport, 12 J. AIR L. & Com. 163 (1941). See also Comment, 67 YALE L.J.
1024, 1033 (1958).
54. A trunkline carrier is one whose certificate authorizes it to provide regularly
scheduled service of an express, long-haul character. 1955 CAB ANN. REP. 25. There
are, at present, twelve certificated domestic trunklines. 1958 CAA STATISTICAL HANDBOOK
62.
55. Twenty-three domestic trunklines were originally granted certificates as "grand-
father" carriers. A series of mergers, changes in corporate name, and one abandonment
have succeeded in reducing the roster of "grandfathers" to twelve. In other words, all
present trunklines, or their predecessors in interest, are "grandfather" carriers. REPORT
ON AIRLINES 18-19. The "Big Four"-American, TWA, Eastern and United-accounted
for 72% of the total revenue passenger-miles flown by all certificated trunk carriers
between September 1957 and September 1958. CAB, Monthly Report of Air Carriers
Traffic Statistics, Sept. 1958, p. 54.
For a criticism of the CAB's policy of meeting domestic transportation requirements
primarily by expanding the routes of "grandfather" carriers, see Maclay & Burt, supra
note 27.
56. Between 1947 and 1956, the total operating revenue of all carriers increased 228%
and between 1949 and 1956 net income increased 369%. 1957 CAB ANN. REP. 39. Total
annual subsidy payments have decreased from $70 million in 1951 to $42 million in 1957,
the major portion of which was received by thirteen local-service carriers. Id. at 10.
For a recent summary of the industry's financial position and outlook, see Doty, Resurg-
ing Trunk Traffic Won't Be Cure-All, Aviation Week, March 9, 1959, p. 135.
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the twelve trunklines has needed direct subsidy,5 7 although at least one of
these carriers may again require government assistanceY
8
Attempting to retain their hard-won financial independence, the trunklines
have been consistently decreasing their short-hop ("puddle-jumping") flights.r0
And, in orienting operations away from the smaller communities, they have
been able to realize the higher profits produced by serving major market areas
57. Hess, The Grozang Pains of Jet Travel, The Reporter, Dec. 25, 1958, pp. 9, 13.
See Seven States Area Investigation, 1A Av. L. REP. ff 22226, at 14323 (CAB Dec. 8,
1958) : "[T]he trunkline carriers have, in a real sense come of age, and ... are, for all
practical purposes, no longer dependent upon Government subsidy." See also Smith, Gov-
eintent Policy Concerning Airline Subsidy, 25 J. AIR L. & Cox. 79 (1958).
58. 'See Northeast Airlines, Inc., 1A Av. L. REP. 1 22242 (CAB Feb. 19, 1959).
59. This decrease is strikingly illustrated by the following chart. The chart correlates
the statistics on annual domestic aircraft departures, 1958 CAA STATIsTIcAL HANDBOOK
100, with data on total annual domestic plane-miles flown, id. at 104; 1957 CAB ANN.
REP. 43. These figures show that, as the number of flights increased, so did the average
distance between stops; hence, a definite trend toward decreased short-haul air carriage
is indicated.
(A) (B) (C)*
Year Aircraft Departures Plane Miles Flom Average Trip Length
1.949 2,023,702 333,707,756 165 miles
1951 2,319,143 393,594,619 170
1953 2,612,767 505,074,347 193
1955 2,901,758 606,584,011 209
1,957 3,318,282 711,126,846 232
*Column (B) divided by column (A)
The following table, broken down in individual trunk-carrier operations, illustrates
the trend between 1950 and 1953 toward increased long-haul carriage.
Average Flight Length (Miles) Increase
Carrier 1950 1953 (Decrease)
American 259 309 50
Braniff 168 164 (4)
Capital 136 151 15
Continental 128 146 18
Delta 215 184 - (31)
Eastern 183 212 29
National 180 228 48
Northeast 87 104 17
Northwest 258 300 42
TWA 274 348 74
United 262 305 43
Western 181. 183 2
Source: 1950-1951 WoLD AIRLINE REcoRD; 1955 id.
In Phoenix, Arizona, for example, the percentage of flight stages (average nonstop trip
length) to and from the city which were over 500 miles long increased from 4.4% in
April, 1953 to 14.3% in April, 1957. James C. Buckley, Inc., Industrial & Transportation
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on a nonstop basis.60 The trend is mirrored in their equipment purchases over
the past decade. In 1949, 333 four-motor and 420 two-motor planes were
being operated by the nation's domestic trunklines;61 in January 1959, 853
four-motor and 405 two-motor aircraft were in use. 62 Thus, as the two-motor
fleet was kept nearly constant,0 3 the funds generated for acquiring new equip-
ment were channeled primarily into purchasing long-haul, high-speed air-
craft.0 4 Not surprisingly, the trunklines have become ill-equipped to service
small cities.6 5
Consultants, Sky Harbor Municipal Airport, Phoenix, Arizona: Terminal Development
Study-Review and Revision of Airport Master Plan (Oct. 10, 1958).
Another index of the shift in carrier and CAB policy over the past eight years is the
decrease in cities with authorized service. In 1950, the Board had approved service to
807 domestic cities; by 1958 this number had dropped to 590. 1958 CAA STATISTICAL
HANDBOOK 62. In 1950, carriers were serving 568 cities, in 1951 an all-time high of 593;
but by 1953 only 549 were receiving air transportation. Ibid. Trunkline abandonment of
the small communities was one of the factors leading to the authorization of local-service
carriers in the Seven States Area Investigation, 1A Av. L. RrE. ff 22226 (CAB Dec. 8,
1958), discussed notes 115-18 infra and accompanying text.
60. See Maclay & Burt, supra note 27, at pp. 152-53; note 3 supra and accompanying
text
61. 'See data listed under each carrier in 1950-51 WORLD AIRLINE RECORD; 1958 CAA
STATISTICAL HANDBooK 64. (The figures in text do not include aircraft used solely in
air-freight transportation.)
62. FAA, UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN AIR TRANSPORTATION. (Agency
Statistical Report, Jan. 14, 1959). (The figures in text do not include aircraft used sole-
ly in air-freight transportation.)
63. Aircraft are kept serviceable for extended periods of time through the practice
of constantly replacing their internal parts. See N.Y. Times, May 26, 1958, p. 29, col. 1
(spare parts keep aircraft "ageless"). Hence, the only reason for acquiring improved
short-haul equipment would be obsolescence, and, until recently no substantial improve-
ment in short-haul aircraft had occurred. See Adams, Future Local Airliie Service De-
pends on State Support, 20 J. AIR L. & Com. 403, 414 (1953) ; 1951 CAB ANN. REP. 2.
Late last year, the Fairchild F-27, a turbo-prop aircraft particularly adapted to local-
service air carriage, was put into operation. See Reed, F-27s Boost West Coast Revenute
Miles, Aviation Week, March 9, 1959, p. 28. In January 1959, ten F-27s were being used
by two local-service carriers. See FAA, UNITED STATES AIRcRAFT ENGAGED IN AIR
TRANSPORTATION (Agency Statistical Report, Jan. 14, 1959).
64. During 1956-57, only 12 additional two-motor planes were acquired by all certifi-
cated carriers; in contrast, the four-motor fleet was increased by 124 new craft. 1958
CAA STATISTICAL HANDOK 64. Braniff and Western report that they have disposed of
all their two-motor DC-S's because smaller schedule points have been eliminated and
system operations expanded. Seven States Area Investigation, 1A Av. L. REP. ff 22226,
at 14321 (CAB Dec. 8, 1958).
65. See U.S. PRESIDENT'S Am COORDINATING COMMITTEE, CIVIL AIR POLICY 11
(1954) (modern aircraft necessitate long-range, high-load-factor operations).
Noting a recent decrease in service by all authorized trunklines, one community stated
that, although the lines blamed lack of demand, "locally it is believed that equipment
needs and scheduling were primary considerations." A number of other cities also at-
tributed curtailed operations to equipment shortages. QUESTIONNAIRE.
The use of larger aircraft permits an airline to reduce the number of its flights with-
out reducing the number of available seats; hence, at a given community, departures may
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Even if, contrary to fact, the trunk carriers were disposed to acquire
modern short-haul equipment, the technology and logistics of the jet age
would preclude such purchases. 66 Actively engaging in their own armament
race, the trunklines are converting to jet aircraft whose most efficient cruis-
ing altitude of 35,000 feet 67 makes the short hop infeasible. 6 Not only will
the cost of conversion absorb all available funds, but it will also necessitate
expanding long-haul service while restricting short-range operations in order
that the carriers may attract needed capital by means of maximized earnings.
Thus, the trunklines may soon force token service upon all but the leading
air markets.6 9
A countervailing development is found in the short-range flights which,
with increasing frequency, local-service carriers provide communities unable
to attract trunkline operations.70 Since 1950, local-service (or, as it is some-
become less frequent and passengers may be forced to board at more inconvenient times.
One city reported that the serving trunkline "has decreased service, as it has within the
past few months disposed of the last of its DC-3 equipment. It is now providing service
... with fewer flights, although the number of seats has -not been decreased." Qu~sTrON-
NAIR&E
66. Over $1 billion will probably be needed by the industry as a whole for the con-
version to jet aircraft. Donahue & Perry, Airline Financing and Operational Problems,
23 J. AIR L. & Cois. 151 (1956). See also Hess, The Growing Pains of Jet Travel, The
Reporter, Dec. 25, 1.958, pp. 9-10. The airlines may experience great difficulty in raising
the necessary funds. Forbes, Jan. 1, 1958, pp. 23-26. If so, the lines will be most unlike-
ly to invest in short-haul equipment or service. See also Hector, Problems in Economic
Regulation of Civil Aviation in the United States, 26 J. AIR L. & CoM. 101 (1959) (dis-
cussion of the current re-equipment "crisis").
67. Hess, supra note 66, at 10.
68. See Cline, Airline Scheduling, Route Patterns and Sales, 23 J. AIR L. & Com.
164 (1956) ; see also Wall Street Journal, April 14, 1959, p. 8, col. 4 (carriers will have
difficulty maintaining high-load factors on jets unless merchandising methods improve).
69. See Doty, Resurging Trunk Traffic Won't Be Cure-All, Aviation Week, March
9, 1959, p. 135. In the Northeastern States Area Investigation, No. 6436, CAB, 1959,
wherein American Airlines is seeking permission to suspend service at Connecticut cities,
one of the carrier's officers stated: "American's future equipment plans . . . will provide
American with turbo-prop aircraft, the Lockheed Electra, with a capacity vastly in excess
of the traffic which Bridgeport and New Haven could be expected to generate in the fore-
seeable future." Quoted in Brief of Bridgeport, New Haven, and New London to the
CAB, p. 1,1.
One city remarks: "On the whole we have excellent trunkline service but worry about
the effect of jets on the smaller intermediate cities between large centers." QUEsTION-
NAIRE (Emphasis added.).
70. The CAB first enunciated its policy of certificating a system of local-service car-
riers on an experimental basis in the Investigation of Local, Feeder and Pick-Up Air
Serv., 6 C.A.B. 1 (1944). The first local-service certificate was granted in 1945. Con-
tinental Air Lines, Inc., Texas Air Service, 6 C.A.B. 289 (1945). Today, there are thir-
teen such carriers. 1958 CAA STATIsTICAL HANDBOOK 62. In 1955, Congress enacted a
little "grandfather clause." 69 Stat. 49, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 401(c) (Supp. V, 1958).
This provision required the OAB to make permanent all outstanding local-service certifi-
cates held by carriers in operation since January 1, 1953; the Board's power was to be
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times called, feeder-line) traffic has quadrupled. 1 But its percentage of total
industry traffic remains minimal. 72 Some short-haul carriers which are at-
tempting to become fully self-supporting have joined the pursuit of large-
market traffic, and the distinction between trunk and feeder lines is not al-
ways preserved.
73
exercised on the same basis as had been employed in certifying "grandfather" trunk car-
riers. See note 17 supra.
The function of local-service carriers has been defined as providing flights "designed
to connect with trunkline carriers for the onward passage of long-distance travelers orig-
inating at or destined to smaller communities." Young, Member of the Board, quoted in
THOMAS 100 n.194; see Texas-Oklahoma Case, 7 C.A.B. 481, 532 (1946) (concurring
and dissenting opinion). See generally Seven States Area Investigation, 1A Av. L. REP.
1 22226, at 14321 (CAB Dec. 8, 1958); FREDERICK 195-222; Ray, The Feeder Airline
Story, 16 J. Am L. & Com. 379 (1949) ; Zook, The Certification of Local and Feeder
Air Carriers, 7 Sw. L.J. 185 (1953).
71. In 1950, local service carriers accounted for 188,749,000 passenger miles. CAB,
BUREAU OF EcoNomic REGULATION, AccOuNTING AND RATES DIvisioN, REcuRRENT RE-
PORT OF MILEAGE AND TRAFic DATA (1950). During the twelve month period ending
Sept. 30, 1958, the corresponding figure was 786,436,000 passenger miles. See CAB,
'MONTHLY REPORT OF AIR CARRIER TRAFFmc STArTISTcs 54 (Sept. 1958).
)Subsidy requirements have not increased proportionally. In 1951, the local-service car-
riers received $17,410,000 in subsidy; in 1958, it was estimated that $26,871,000 would be
necessary. See CAB, SERvIcE MAIL PAY AND SUBSIDY FOR U.S. CERTIFICATED Am CAR-
RIERS (1954).
72. Because of their typically short-haul operations, and the fact that they do not
provide direct (one-plane) or nonstop service between major cities, the local service lines
generate but a small proportion of total airline business. In 1958, local-service carriers
accounted for only 3.2% of overall passenger miles flown by certificated carriers. CAB,
MONTHLY REPORT OF AIR CARRIER TRAFFIc STATISTIcS 54 (Sept. 1958). See also REPORT
ON AMLINES 24.
73. See Middle Atlantic Area Case, 10 C.A.B. 41, 45 (1949). Restrictions were placed
on local-service carriers in the Seven States Area Investigation, No. 7454, CAB, Dec. 8,
1958, pp. 143-50, to prevent any further expansion into the long-haul service market. See
CAB Policy Statement on Local Air Carriers, 2 Av. L. REP. ff 23123 (Sept. 25, 1951).
One eastern airport official states that the majority of local-service carriers have failed
to develop local markets or to time flights so that they connect with trunklines at trans-
fer points. Instead, he claims, the feeders seek to grow bigger, to "skim the cream" at
larger terminals, and to become trunkline carriers. QUESTIONNAIRE.
The average flight-stage length of all the local service carriers was 85.2 miles in 1958,
a 2.5 mile increase over the 1957 average. Aviation Week, March 9, 1959, p. 149.
Helicopter service may provide an alternative solution for the smaller communities, or
at least for the air commuter. Currently, though, only three cities-New York, Chicago
and Los Angeles-have certificated helicopter carriers. 1958 CAA STATISTICAL HANDBOOK
62. See generally Sawyer, The Promise of Helicopter Transportation, 23 J. AIR L. &
Com. 70 (1956). Another source of local service is the nonscheduled carrier. Some carriers
of this type operate under the exemption provision of the act, §146(b), which permits an
airline, with Board approval, to provide a particular type of service in the absence of
certificate authority. See Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation, Av. L. REP. (1954-
57 CAB Cas.) 1 21879 (Nov. 15, 1955); Air Freight Forwarder Investigation, Av. L.
REP. (1954-57 CAB Cas.) ff 21864 (Aug. 30, 1.955). Other nonscheduled carriers operate
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The Community
Of seventy cities which responded to a Yale Law Journal questionnaire,
forty-six stated that their current level of air service was inadequate.7 4 Vari-
ous shortcomings were said to constitute inadequacy: a total absence of air
transportation; the unavailability of flights to a sufficient number of cities;
a lack of frequent, through, non- or one-stop flights to and from distant
markets; too few flights at convenient hours or with modem aircraft.7 A
progressive community, whether primarily an industrial or marketing center,
the hub of an agricultural region, or a vacation resort, finds poor service in-
tolerable. 76 A city which ignores the quality of its air commerce may fail to
under temporary "supplemental" certificates authorizing limited flights. See Large Irreg-
ular Air Carrier Investigation, 1A Av. L. REP. 1 22247 (CAB Jan. 28, 1959).
The service provided by the noncertificated and supplemental carriers is not discussed
in this Comment for the following reasons: (1) carriers operating under § 416(b) are
not subject to the "adequate service" requirement of § 404(a), see 14 C.F.R. § 291.15
(1956); (2) the Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation, No. 5132, CAB, Jan. 28,
1959, p. 9, has restricted the supplemental airlines to no more than 10 flights per month
between any two cities, and the adequacy of their service is thus, for the time being, a
moot issue; (3) unpredictable schedules and route patterns preclude characterizing the
operations of nonscheduled carriers as "serving" communities; rather, these lines serve
particular types of traffic, e.g., military personnel, chartered tours, migratory farm work-
ers and peak season tourist traffic; (4) because they are free to seek maximum profits
and to serve any point in the United States, see id. at 20-21, the operations of non-
scheduled airlines are most likely to be heavily concentrated in long-haul traffic between
major market areas; and (5) the smaller cities have not sought the services of non-
certificated or supplemental carriers to remedy local inadequacies, for the sporadic nature
of these carriers' scheduling plus the uncertainty of their future position in the industry
militates against substantial community reliance on their operations. Replies to the Jour-
nal Questionnaire reveal that communities characterizing the adequacy of local service
give little if any weight to nonscheduled operations. Such operations were not mentioned
in either the context of adequate service or that of community promotional activity.
For general discussions of the nonscheduled carriers, see Large Irregular Air Carrier
Investigation, supra; KEYES, FEDERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AIR TRANSPORTATION ch.
5 (1951) ; REPORT ON AIRLINES 28-33, 74-110; Cherington, The Essential Role of Large
Irregular Air Carriers, 19 J. AIR L. & Com. 411 (1952).
74. See introductory footnote (*) and notes 2-3 supra. Of the forty-six, nineteen
stated that air service had recently deteriorated.
75. The Question aire made no attempt to define adequacy but merely asked whether
airline service was commensurate with local needs. See APPENDIX, question 5. Those
replies detailing the nature of inadequacy cited lack of service in a particular direction,
lack of service to a particular community, undependability, poor reservation and informa-
tion service, insufficient number of flights, unreasonable departure and arrival hours, con-
tinual changing of schedules, lack of competition, concentration of service at a neighbor-
ing airport rather than the local one, poor intrastate service, poor connecting service,
lack of direct or one-carrier service, excessive stops on flights serving the city, inadequate
number of available seats, and lack of coach service.
76. See OGBURN, THE SocIAL EPFccTs OF AviATIoN chs. 24 (manufacturing), 25
(marketing), 29 (agriculture), 19 (recreation) (1946). The Board has stated that mar-
keting centers usually develop more air passengers per unit of population than cities with
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attract industries contemplating relocation or expansion, and may bring about
a reduction in the level of business transactions on which local merchants and
commercial enterprises depend. 77 The close relationship between transporta-
tion and financial prosperity and the current deterioration in railroad pas-
senger service suggest that the growth of many communities may well depend
on improved airline service.78 A large number of cities are fully cognizant of
the dangers lurking in their second-class air service. 79 Several are considering
corrective measures or have begun to rectify deficiencies.80 Certain courses
have been tried or proposed, the efficacy of which bears examination.
COMMUNITY-CARRIER COOPERATION
Outside the Act
To promote air transportation, many municipalities have undertaken exten-
sive improvements of their local airdromes. Hangers, repair depots and lux-
urious terminal accommodations have been offered the airlines, often at below-
cost or very low rentals. Communities have constructed landing strips and
ramp space sufficient to permit uncongested service by large commercial air-
craft. Modern terminal buildings have been erected to attract outbound pas-
senger traffic. All-weather navigational equipment has been installed so that
constant air service can be maintained.8 1 And, frequently, localities have en-
balanced economies. See Fort Worth Investigation, No. 7382, CAB, Sept. 23, 1958, p. 33
n.52.
77. See Brief of the City and Chamber of Commerce of Forth Worth to the Ex-
aminer, Fort Worth Investigation, No. 7382, CAB, Jan. 21, 1957, pp. 25-28. Arven San-
ders, manager of the Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina, airport, has asserted that "two
major industrial moves to North Carolina from the Great Lakes area are hanging fire
until direct airline service is available." Greensboro Daily News, Jan. 18, 1959, § A, p. 14,
col. 7. One community in the southwest, having recently begun construction of elaborate
convention accommodations, reports: "In order for this convention facility to serve the
purpose for which it is being constructed, it is necessary that air transportation . . . be
adequate." QUESTIONNAIR Another in a southern vacation area states that it has been
laboring under a competitive disadvantage because of better air service at a nearby com-
munity. Ibid.
78. In reporting on whether surface transportation was satisfactory, fourteen cities
claimed that it was not. Eleven specifically mentioned the recent deterioration of railroad
passenger service. Ibid.
79. See 1957 CAB ANN. REP. 5.
80. Twelve cities are contemplating filing complaints with the CAB against their
serving airlines. QUESTIONNAn. Of the seventy cities responding to the Questionnaire,
only one had never participated in CAB proceedings involving service to the community.
Many stated that they had at least submitted testimony in every proceeding in which
local air service was at issue. Ibid.
81. Buckley, The State of the Scheduled Airlines in Sound Airport Developimt,
17 J. AIR L. & CoM. 22, 23 (1950).
Responding to the question concerning adequacy of airport facilities, forty-five com-
munities reported that improvement plans were underway or nearing completion. Eight
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sured the availability of reasonably priced limousine or taxi service to hotel
and business districts.
While a modern physical plant may stimulate traffic, communities also use
supplementary promotional devices to develop a constant stream of air com-
merce. A few cities have instituted vigorous, mass-media advertising cam-
paigns to activate traffic potential.8 2 Civic pride in the local airport is evoked
in order to offset the attraction of better service at a nearby community.83
And some localities employ aviation consultants who assist carriers by analyz-
ing traffic patterns and measuring passenger demand.8 4 Whatever measures
are chosen, they are designed to benefit the airlines and foster a stable, mutual-
ly advantageous alliance between carrier and community.8 3 For example, if an
airline encounters difficulties in profitably serving a city, landing and terminal
fees can be geared to the volume of traffic generated, or reduced until the
demand for air transportation increases.8 6 Active cooperation of this sort is
others stated that additions were either contemplated or under discussion. QUESTION-
NAIRE. Facilities that were being constructed or were recently completed include: new
terminal building, runway lighting, enlarged parking areas, additional taxi strips, new
control tower, high intensity lighting system, communications building, landscaping, en-
larged hangers and shops, accommodations for jet service, approach lights, mechanical
facilities for baggage handling, restaurant and coffee shop, air postal facilities, additional
gate postilions. Ibid.
"Aviation is today an established method of transportation. The future, even the near
future, will make it still more general. The city that is without the foresight to build
the ports for the new traffic may soon be left behind in the race of competition." Hesse
v. Rath, 249 N.Y. 436, 438, 164 N.E. 342 (1928) (Cardozo, J.). For an excellent discus-
sion of the complex of facilities needed in a modern airport, see FR.nEICK 118-22.
82. For discussion of the role of advertising in promoting local air service, see Israel,
Television Editorial, The Opportunity at Friendship Airport, WJZ-TV, Baltimore, Md.,
Dec. 10, 1958. Israel noted that Philadelphia, which spends up to $50,000 a year to pro-
mote its airport, has exceeded every other city in the country in growth of its commer-
cial air operations.
Widespread use of advertising has also been advocated by a former member of the
CAB. See Adams, Future Local Airline Service Depends on State Support, 20 J. Am L.
& Com. 403, 413 (1953).
83. One municipality reports that promotion of its local airport has offset the attrac-
tion of a neighboring, better-served airfield. QUESTIONNAIRE. In Baltimore, where Friend-
ship International Airport has long assumed a secondary role because of its proximity
to the Washington National Airport, the use of a "Fly Friendship" campaign has been
strongly advocated. Israel, supra note 82.
84. Sixteen cities state that aviation consultants have been employed either to assist
in airport development or to prepare exhibits and reports for certification proceedings.
QUESTIONNAIRE.
85. See Buckley, supra note 81, at 23. This relationship can be strengthened by main-
taining a constant liaison on mutual problems.
86. In 1955, Ozark Airlines was having difficulty serving the Quad-City Airport at
Moline, Illinois, and requested that municipal officials gear landing fees, to revenues.
When Moline refused the request, Ozark petitioned the Board to serve the area through
the nearby Davenport, Iowa, airfield as Davenport had expressed willingness to cooperate
with the carrier. The petition was granted. Air Service by Ozark Air Lines, Inc. tv
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After a carrier has applied for a new or extended route, the communities
to be served can render the carrier invaluable assistance during the certifica-
tion proceeding.88 These cities may appear as either intervenors or supple-
mental "applicants"89 to demonstrate the inadequacy of present air transpor-
Davenport, Iowa-Moline, Illinois, Av. L. REP. (1954-57 CAB Cas.) if 21880 (1955). See
generally Adams, supra note 82, at 414.
On the other hand, one eastern airport official says that "no amount of local subsidy
in the form of cheap rental or elaborate field and terminal construction will necessarily
produce improved service." QUESTIONNAME.
87. Of the twenty-four cities that find local air service adequate, twenty-two report
that carrier cooperation is "excellent." (The other two made no comment.) Of the forty-
six cities deeming air operations inadequate, only fourteen reported carrier cooperation
to be "good." QUESTIONNAIRE.
88. As a general rule, a certification proceeding is initiated by a carrier seeking to
add one or more points to its route structure. When an application is received by the
CAB, it is assigned a docket number, an examiner is appointed, and a pre-hearing con-
ference held. Representatives of both interested groups--carrier and communities to be
served-present their views at the conference. Also, a member of the Bureau of Air
Operations, an administrative arm of the CAB, see CAB Statement of Organization, 22
Fed. Reg. 6124 (1957), usually attends and participates actively. The conference defines
the issues to be examined in the subsequent certification proceeding. After the examiner
submits his report, the Board issues a consolidation order enumerating the relevant is-
sues, and sets dates for the filing of exhibits and a field hearing. Since no one knows
the exact scope of a proceeding until the consolidation order is issued, parties affected
by the order may submit petitions to intervene or to consolidate pending applications.
The Board then rules on these petitions. Issues, parties and applications now being de-
limited, the proceeding is sent to a hearing examiner. Exhibits are filed, a field hearing
is held, and briefs are submitted to the hearing examiner. After his report-known as
the initial decision-is handed down, briefs are submitted to the CAB itself and a date
is set for oral arguments. Three or four months after these are completed, a decision is
rendered. See Westwood, Procedure in New Route Cases Before the Civil Aeronautics
Board, 14 J. Am L. & Cozy. 267 (1947); 1956 CAB ANN. REP. 42.
89. Municipal applicants for service proceed under § 401(h) of the act (now § 401
(g)), which empowers the Board to amend a carrier's certificate upon petition or com-
plaint and after hearing. The term "applicant," as applied to municipalities, has been
coined by the Board to refer to those seeking service. The act, however, does not provide
for municipal applicants as such. It has been suggested that the act be amended to so
provide in order to facilitate Board action on community request. QuESTIONNRAn. Under
the optional-investigation provision of § 401(h), the Board need not take immediate action
but may delay a hearing. Such a deferral, it has been charged, is "tantamount to denial,"
ibid., as this type of interlocutory decision of an administrative agency is not appealable.
See CAB v. State Airlines, Inc., 338 U.S. 572, 577 (1950) (Board free to work out
application procedures); Western Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 184 F.2d 545, 548-49 (9th Cir.
1950) (court cannot supervise administrative docket).
Intervenors are of two types. Formal intervenors proceed under rule 15 of the Board's
Rules of Practice, 14. C.F.R. § 302.15 (1956). They become full parties to the proceed-
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tation and the need for inaugural or supplementary service.90 Also the com-
munity, more propitiously than the airline, can request public officials (such
as governors, congressmen and executive-department employees) to appear
in support of the proposed service,91 although the legality of governmental
pressure is currently undergoing judicial examination.9 2 Since a potential for
increased traffic must be shown, municipal officials may assume the added
responsibility of preparing exhibits on the economic importance of the area
and on the strength of commercial ties with municipalities to which service
will be provided.93 The applying carrier can then concentrate on establishing
the expected financial return, the effect of CAB approval on area and national
transportation patterns, the need for competition, and the anticipated effect
on the applicant's role within the industry. Municipal support is particularly
ing and may participate in all of its stages. Informal intervenors participate according to
rule 14, 14 C.F.R. § 302.14 (1956), which allows them to present evidence, cross-examine
witnesses and submit written statements. Rule 14 does not authorize intervenors to file
briefs.
90. Address by Perry H. Taft, National Airports Conference, Nov. 3, 1957; Rich-
mond, Forecasting Air Passenger Traffic by Alfitiple Regression Analysis, 22 J. Am L.
& Com. 434, 435 (1955).
91. Government officials may appear and argue orally by virtue of rule 14, 14 C.F.R.
§ 302.14 (1956) (informal intervenors). Thirty-two cities report that they have requested
government officials and executive department employees to testify on their behalf in
certification proceedings. QUESTIOxNAImE. Defense Department officials are frequently
approached when the airport to be served is located -near a military base. Ibid. One city
states that the local post office supplied statistical information on volume of mail, the
information to be used as demonstrating the need for service. Ibid. (Prior to 1953, the
Post Office Department often intervened in opposition to the granting of extended routs
to carriers when they would involve increased subsidy, for subsidy payments were at that
time the Post Office Department's responsibility. See, e.g., Additional Service to Kansas
Case, 14 C.A.B. 875, 891 (1951). Reorganization Plan No. 10, 67 Stat. 644 (1953), shifted
subsidy disbursement to the CAB's budget, leaving only mail-carriage payments with
the Post Office.)
92. Capitol Airways, Inc. v. CAB, No. 25434, 2d Cir., 1959. Capitol is appealing the
Great Lakes-Southeast Serv. Case, 1A Av. L. REP. 1 22211 (CAB Sept. 30, 1958), which
denied its application to serve the Chicago-Miami and Detroit-Miami markets. One of
the grounds being urged for reversal is that Capitol was prejudiced at the oral argu-
ment before the Board by the appearance of six members of Congress whose testimony,
it claims, amounted to illegal interference with the functions of an administrative agency.
See Brief for Petitioners, pp. 14-24, Capitol Airways, Inc. v. CAB, supra. See also Rizley,
Some Personal Reflections After Eight Months as Chairnan of the Civil Aeronautics
Board, 22 J. AIR L. & Cot. 445, 450 (1955) (criticizing congressional interference and
pressure).
93. "[A] community, if it is to be successful in prosecuting its case, must participate
in all stages of the proceeding. In connection with documentary material, particularly
exhibits, the community must go first class because nothing is more discouraging to the
Examiner and the members of the Board than a documentary record filled with 'junk.'"
Address by Perry H. Taft, National Airport Conference, Nov. 3, 1957. See also Rich-
mond, supra -note 90 (activities of one city in certification proceeding).
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vital when sufficient passenger demand is uncertain, for the CAB has often
held carrier-city cooperation a prerequisite to service extensions in marginal
traffic areas.
94
The community which closely coordinates its activities with those of an
applying carrier, however, may encounter many disadvantages. For example,
when the airline is induced to apply for a route extension through an offer
of airport facilities at below-cost rates, a subsequent increase in landing and
rental fees is quite likely to strain relations.95 Or, the relationship may end
if the city later supports the entrance of competitive service, for the once-pre-
ferred carrier may deem such support inconsistent with the initial partner-
ship.09 Analogously, if a number of applicants seek a route extension, the
community which allies itself with one of them may later find this approach
to have been imprudent. The favored applicant may use the stop only as a
temporary stepping-stone into a major market area ;97 and the city whose co-
operation was so assiduously elicited may soon find its level of service sharply
diminished as equipment is rerouted to more profitable long-haul flights. 98
In this situation, municipal officials would have been better advised to remain
94. See, e.g., Seven States Area Investigation, 1A Av. L. REP. 11 22226, at 14320
(CAB Dec. 8, 1958) (emphasizing mutual carrier-community responsibilities); cf. West-
wood, supra note 88. One city, noting that its level of air service was geared to the finan-
cial health of its only authorized carrier, made it a policy to provide strong support to
every petition of the carrier for a route extension which offered promise of improving
the airline's financial position. QUESTIONNAnE
95. If the community is successful in obtaining scheduled air transportation service
from the airline which has been so "helpful" to it, the community not only gives
that airline the key to the city but a more or less free ride at the airport as well.
Such a temporary marriage of convenience is bound to end in an unsatisfactory
future divorce, with long range bad feelings existing between the community and
the airline.
Address by Perry H. Taft, National Airport Conference, Nov. 3, 1957.
96. This possibility is well illustrated by the recent aviation turmoil in Raleigh-Dur-
ham and Greensboro, North Carolina. Distressed by the efforts of an initially favored
local-service carrier to block the entrance of competitive trunkline service, Greensboro
first considered revoking the local-service carrier's landing permit, then decided to petition
the CAB to withdraw the certificate of the local-service carrier if its presence would
prevent better trunkline service. Raleigh-Durham was also considering the possibility of
taking action against the local-service carrier in light of the latter's apparent determina-
tion to block trunkline flights to the midwest. See Greensboro Daily News, Jan. 18, 1959,
§ A, p. 14, col. 5; id., Jan. 21, 1959, § B, p. 1, col. 7.
97. "Here again, bad feelings between the community and the airline are engendered,
particularly where the community subsequently discovers that it was being 'used' by the
airline as a crutch to assist the airline in actually obtaining a route extension to a point
beyond that community." Address by Perry H. Taft, National Airport Conference, Nov.
3, 1957.
98. Noting a recent decline in the service provided by its two authorized trunklines,
one city stated that the carriers were seeking long-haul routes. QUESnO7XNAnF Another
charged that the authorized trunkline serving the community had a "gravy train" dur-
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nonpartisan, especially since their choice undoubtedly carried great weight
with the CAB. Hence, many communities remain independent in route-al-
location proceedings, and confine their role to demonstrating a need for more
service.99 This approach enables city officials to avoid alienating a particular
carrier, yet to present their own views vigorously. 00
Obviously, however, the airlines may refuse to take the initiative in applying
for route extensions. Equally obviously, a community then cannot limit its
function to participating in proceedings originated by a carrier.' 0 ' In fact, even
the active promotion of air travel and the development of ground facilities
may fail to entice the carriers, for the lure of long-haul profits may make them
oblivious to financial and moral suasion on the local level.'0 2 Furthermore, if
a city is already on the air map, its most effective course of action may not
be procuring the services of a competitive carrier but ensuring that presently
authorized airlines maintain an adequate level of operations. In any event,
whether a municipality seeks first-carrier or competitive service, or a Board
order directing an improvement in the quality of transportation presently be-
ing furnished, the community can turn to the Civil Aeronautics Act for relief.
ing its tenure and could have developed an excellent level of traffic, but that the line
considered serving the city a nuisance. Accordingly, the city reported it would be happy
to have the CAB replace the trunkline with a local-service carrier. Ibid.
99. According to one city:
We believe that since it is the function and the duty of the Civil Aeronautics
Board to designate the appropriate carrier to provide the needed service, it would
be presumptuous and psychologically unwise for us to attempt to pre-empt this
function. Then, too, it may appear that the civic party is attempting to "carry
water" for the carrier. It can very easily prejudice the civic party. We prefer to
concentrate our efforts on demonstrating our service needs.
QUESTIONNAIRE.
100. According to an aviation attorney for a southwestern city active in the pro-
motion of adequate air service:
The program which the city . . . adopted some six or eight years ago was that
we would never try to voice to the CAB what air line would render a given ser-
vice; instead we would present our facts to the CAB showing the need for service
and leave the question to the CAB and the air lines to figure out who can render
a given service. This has left our city completely free to present its own views
vigorously and independently. As a result I think we have the good will of all the
air lines.
QUESTIONNAIRE.
101. For example, one community does not wait for carriers to make application for
services which the city needs, but inaugurates its own proceedings instead. QUESTION-
NAME. And see Tucson Airport Authority, Av. L. REP. (1954-57 CAB Cas.) ff 21977
(1956) (community originated proceeding) ; Service to Phoenix Case, Av. L. REP. (1954-
57 CAB Cas.) 11 22079 (1957) (same).
102. See Israel, mpra note 82 (["Baltimore's] magnificent terminal building echoes
with emptiness. Friendship [Airport] has been scorned by the airlines. It has been for-
gotten by the Federal Government. It has even been neglected by the people of Baltimore.
They have long since lost faith in the airport's meager service.").
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THE COMMUNITY AND CARRIER IN OPPOSITION
Securing New Service
Communities may seek improved service under section 401(h) of the act
(now section 401(g)). This provision allows the CAB, upon petition, com-
plaint, or its own motion, and after notice or hearing, to alter or amend any
certificate by adding or deleting stops whenever the public convenience and
necessity so require. 103 Despite the requirement in section 401(d)(1) that
the affected airline be "fit, willing, and able" to perform, opposition on the
part of a carrier does not preclude amendment of its certificate. On the
strength of an airline's original application for a certificate, the line is con-
clusively presumed to be willing to serve a revised route pattern not material-
ly different from that initially specified.1 4 Consequently, the Board has au-
thority to order a recalcitrant carrier to serve hitherto unscheduled points as
intermediate stops. A city may nevertheless encounter difficulty in persuading
the CAB to proceed under section 401(h), for the Board is under no com-
pulsion to act immediately on a community's petition. 10 5 Moreover, to amend
a certificate is not to guarantee that service will be provided; the airline still
retains its independence in initiating and maintaining service ' 0 -subject,
however, to the general obligations imposed by section 404(a)'s "adequate
service" provision.
The Section 401(h) Cases
Despite its shortcomings, section 401 (h) has been extensively employed.
107
Indeed, with intersecting air routes virtually blanketing the country, few cities
103. See Netterville, Local Service Airlines: Trunkline Suspensions in Aid of the
Local Service Experiment, 26 So. CA1L L. REv. 229, 250-61 (1953) (discussion of the
legislative background and constitutionality of section 401 (h)). See also THOMAS 11-1,18.
For a review of the Board's power under § 401 (h), see Braniff Route Extension In-
vestigation, Av. L. REP. (1954-57 CAB Cas.) f1 21974, at 14691 (1956); Note, Compul-
sory Inauguration and Extension of Air Carrier Routes, 38 GEo. L.J. 81 (1949).
104. CAB v. State Airlines, Inc., 338 U.S. 572 (1950); Southeastern States Case,
8 C.A.B. 716, 720 (1947); Panagra Terminal Investigation, 4 C.A.B. 670, 673 (1944).
In applying for a certificate amendment, carriers often insert a "catch-all" clause re-
questing that they be considered as applicants for any and all new routes which the Board
may find required by public convenience and necessity. See, e.g., Seven States Area In-
vestigation, IA Av. L. REP. f1 22226, at 14302 (CAB Dec. 8, 1958). The Board frequently
relies on general prayers in applications when it awards carriers certificates authorizing
service routes not specifically requested. Ibid.
105. See note 89 supra. One aviation attorney has remarked: "Generally, I would say
that it would be best for a municipality to interest an airline in serving it, and have that
airline request authority from the Civil Aeronautics Board to serve the city in question.
... [W]ithout the support of an airline, there might be some considerable delay in secur-
ing a hearing." QUESTIONNAIRE.
106. See notes 41-51 supra and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Service to Phoenix Case, Av.. L. REP. (1954-57 CAB Cas.) f" 22079
(1957) ; Tucson Airport Authority, Av. L. REP. (1954-57 CAB Cas.) IT 21977 (1956).
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are so isolated that they could not obtain new-carrier service by having an
outstanding certificate amended.' 0 8 The recent Service to Ely, Nevada case is
illustrative.10 9
Ely's population is 3,558; its location, a desert 250 miles southwest of Salt
Lake City. Though geographically remote, the town is the center of extensive
oil and copper extraction operations. Before 1955, Ely had no commercial
passenger transportation of any sort. It had a small airport, however, which
it was willing to expand if airline service were authorized. Seeking such ser-
vice, the town's representatives approached United Airlines officials; the lat-
ter declined to apply for an amendment of United's certificate on account of
Ely's marginal traffic potential. Ely then petitioned the CAB under section
401(h) for an amendment of United's certificate. The carrier immediately
intervened in opposition, and the hearing examiner accepted its contention
that traffic potential was too limited to support the proposed operation." 0
After extensive investigation, the CAB reversed.
Although the Board agreed with the examiner that United would be likely
to sustain losses initially in serving Ely, it found the probable deficit to be
less than the examiner had estimated." I The town's extreme isolation and the
absence of any commercial surface transportation were given great weight." 2
The Board also observed that the region's substantial copper and oil opera-
tions indicated significant traffic potential." 3 Ely's willingness to provide ex-
panded airport facilities was taken as a satisfactory expression of the town's
support of air service."14 The CAB concluded that an experimental period of
air transportation was warranted, and authorized United to initiate service
into Ely for a trial period of two years. Acquiescing, the airline cooperated
and currently provides two daily round-trip flights--one connecting with Salt
Lake City, the other with Elko, Nevada." 5
Another decision that should have far-reaching effects for the small com-
munity seeking inaugural service from an uncooperative airline is the Seven
States Area Investigation."6 The CAB there announced a "use it or lose it"
108. Air-route maps for trunklines and local-service carriers as of June 30, 1957, can
be found in 1957 CAB ANN. REP. between pp. 2 and 3.
109. Av. L. REP. (1954-57 OAB Cas.) ff 21812 (1955).
110. The foregoing information is taken from Service to Ely, Nevada, No. 6528,
CAB, March 17, 1955, app. pp. 2-3.
111. Av. L. REP. (1954-57 CAB Cas.) 1 21912, at 14218 (1955).
112. Ibid. Where terrain is difficult and surface transportation slow, the need for air
transportation becomes greater. All Am. Aviation, Inc., 2 C.A.B. 133, 151 (1940).
113. Av. L. REP. (1954-57 CAB Cas.) II 21812, at 14218 (1955).
114. Ibid.
115. OFFICIAL AIRLINE GumE C-340, C-344 (March 1, 1959).
116. 1A Av. L. REP. 1 22226 (CAB Dec. 8, 1958). The investigation was instituted
by the Board upon the petition of North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, Neb-
raska, Wisconsin, and Illinois; these states sought a determination of the local air-service
needs in their general area. The proceeding embraced petitions by four local air carriers
for route extensions, requests by fifty-four city applicants, and applications of two trunk-
lines to suspend or delete service at many points throughout the area. Id. at 14293.
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policy in authorizing local air transportation for cities in the relevant area,
many of which were without any service.117 Specifically, the Board reserved
the right to suspend or delete service after eighteen months at any point with
an average of less than five enplaned passengers per day."18 Communities
with marginal traffic potential were thus given an opportunity to demonstrate
their ability to support local air service which they could not obtain through
orthodox certification proceedings." 9 This decision has practical limitations,
however. While it should prove helpful to a community lacking air service,
a city already on the national air map may encounter well-nigh insurmount-
able difficulties in generating sufficient demand to support an additional air-
line. M ost likely, therefore, such a city will find proceedings against its pres-
ently authorized carriers the most feasible method of rectifying local inade-
quacies.
Improving Present Service: The Section 404 Cases
A city which receives unsatisfactory service from its certificated airlines is
theoretically able to obtain redress under the Civil Aeronautics Act. By re-
quiring every certificated carrier to provide "adequate service," section 404(a)
attempts to ensure a satisfactory level of operations. 20 And, notwithstanding
adequacy, section 404(b) prohibits an airline from granting any undue pref-
erence or engaging in any unjust discrimination when serving different
communities.' 2 1 This command presumably controls both airline scheduling
policies ' 22 and CAB approval of a route extension. 1 23 To date, however,
117. Id. at 14319. A number of the certificates were granted on a temporary basis to
facilitate subsequent Board reappraisal. Id. at 14297.
118. Seven States Area Investigation, No. 7454, CAB, Dec. 8, 1958, pp. 137-38. The
average number of passengers enplaned was to be computed without regard for the first
six months of service. Id. at 138 n.158.
119. Id. at 136.
Many of these communities will be receiving air service for the first time. Others,
whose air service has been confined to rather perfunctory and inadequate schedules
provided by trunkline carriers as part of their long haul flights, will be given an
opportunity to prove their greater traffic generating ability with local service bet-
ter adapted to their transportation needs.
1A Av. L. REP. U 22226, at 14320 (CAB Dec. 8, 1958).
In granting or denying air service to the applicant cities, the Board was primarily
influenced by the following considerations: the volume of probable traffic which would be
developed, the cost of the service to the carrier and the Government, the location of the
community in relation to presently available air service, the length of detour from present
routes necessary to serve a particular city, the cost involved therein, and the isolation
of a community from its primary trade centers. Id. at 14293.
120. The section is quoted in part at note 39 supra.
121 The section is quoted in full at note 39 supra.
122. Fort Worth Investigation, No. 7382, CAB, Sept. 23, 1958, p. 32 n.51, discussed
notes 139-72 infra and accompanying text. But see Philadelphia-Transatlantic Serv. Case,
Av. L. REP. (1951-54 CAB Cas.) U 21454, at 16393 (1952), discussed note 172 infra.
123. Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority v. CAB, 231 F.2d 517, 521 (D.C.
Cir. 1956), discussed notes 134-38 infra and accompanying text.
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sections 404(a) and (b) have not achieved effective expression, and have
therefore afforded the disadvantaged city little practical protection.
12 4
The Grand Rapids, Toledo and Greensboro Cases
Grand Rapids. Increasing dissatisfaction with airline practices has led sev-
eral communities to intervene in, or to institute, proceedings before the CAB
in order to bring charges of inadequate service, discriminatory practices, or
both. Among the more significant section 404(a) controversies awaiting CAB
resolution is the Flint-Grand Rapids Adequacy of Service Investigation.125
Grand Rapids, Michigan, currently depends upon one trunk carrier-Capital
Airlines-for air transportation to distant points with which that city has sub-
stantial commercial ties.126 Faced with Capital's decision to abandon through
124. Shortly after the passage of the act, one commentator pointed out that the Board
must "in the near future" determine what constituted "adequate service," preferably by
investigating carrier operations. PuFFa 164. Indeed, the Board itself recognized that the
act authorized it to order adequate service to certificated stops should the need for such
action arise. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 1 C.A.A. 723, 730 (1940). Yet, it was not
until 1958 that the CAB rendered a decision interpreting the mandatory requirement of
§ 404(a). See Brief of Grand Rapids, p. 1, Flint-Grand Rapids Adequacy of Service In-
vestigation, No. 9177, OAB, 1959 ("In only two cases has the Civil Aeronautics Board
been called upon to pass directly on the question of what constituted 'adequate' service
within the meaning of Section 404(a). . . ."). The two cases referred to were the Fort
Worth Investigation, 1A Av. L. RES. 1 22205 (CAB Sept. 23, 1958), discussed notes
139-72 infra and accompanying text, and the pending Washington-Baltimore Adequacy
of Serv. Investigation, No. 8148, CAB, 1959, discussed note 155 infra.
As for § 404(b), the Reopened Charleston-Columbus Case, 1A Av. L. REP. ff 22153
(Jan. 16, 1958), discussed notes 134-38 infra and accompanying text, and the Fort Worth
Investigation, supra, are the only significant decisions on that section. The Board has
stated that investigations will be instituted only when a reasonable cause for complaint
exists and solution to the adequacy problem cannot be arrived at through informal means.
1956 CAB ANN. REP. 12.
An Investigation of Coach-Type Service in Certain New York Markets, No. 9973,
CAB, 1959, now pending before the CAB, is the only Board-initiated investigation of car-
rier compliance with section 404(a). Ten trunklines and one local service carrier have
been made parties to the proceeding. Though the specific purpose of the investigation is
to determine whether coach service available from New York to various markets is
legally adequate, and what action would be necessary, the Board intends to formulate
standards for the carriers' guidance in providing adequate coach service in other markets.
The initial decision of the hearing examiner is pending.
The Board recently added to its economic regulations rules applicable to adequacy-of-
service complaints. See 14 C.F.R. § 302.700-.705 (Supp. 1959), 22 Fed. Reg. 10439 (1957).
These rules provide that a proceeding to determine adequacy may be instituted by the
filing of a petition or complaint. The parties to the proceeding shall be the complainant,
the carrier(s) challenged, Bureau Counsel, and any others permitted to intervene. If the
air carrier complained against does not satisfy the complaint and there shall appear to
be any reasonable ground for investigation, the Board will look into the charges.
125. No. 9177, CAB, 1959.
126. Grand Rapids is also served by two feeder lines-North Central and Lake Cen-
tral-neither of which is involved in the proceeding. See OFFICIAL AIRLINE GUIDE cols.
420-23 (Quick Ref. ed., March 1, 1959).
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service to these areas and to substitute the equivalent of a feeder-line connec-
tion instead, Grand Rapids has filed a complaint alleging that Capital is
shirking its section 404(a) obligations.1 27 The city requested that a competi-
tive airline be authorized on the theory that certain qualitative inadequacies
such as inefficiency and undependability could not be remedied by a CAB
order. Although this request was summarily denied,1 28 the Board did institute
an investigation to determine whether Capital is providing adequate service
to Grand Rapids and, if not, to decide what specific improvements are needed.
The CAB must now formulate a standard of adequacy for a carrier holding
a monopoly on a community's trunk carriage.
Toledo. In the Toledo Adequacy of Service Investigation, Capital is again
the principal defendant and section 404(a) again underlies the controversy. 29
But, unlike Grand Rapids, this case is set in a competitive context. 30 Ac-
cording to the complaint, Capital, in virtually terminating service between
Toledo and Chicago, Cleveland, New York and Philadelphia, failed to put
competitive pressure on the four trunklines also serving these points. 131 Thus,
Toledo alleges, Capital has retarded the normal growth of air travel 132 by
127. "It is apparent from this schedule pattern that Capital Airlines is providing
essentially a local semice operation for Grand Rapids." Brief of Grand Rapids to CAB
Examiner, p. 26, Flint-Grand Rapids Adequacy of Service Investigation, No. 9177, CAB,
1959. Grand Rapids has stressed the statement of one of Capital's witnesses at the field
hearing: "In effect, we are operating our own feeder system." Ibid.
The CAB Bureau of Air Operations, a frequent participant in certificate and service
proceedings, see note 88 supra, concluded that Capital's service from Grand Rapids to
Detroit, Minneapolis/St. Paul, New York and Milwaukee was in fact inadequate. Addi-
tionally, the Bureau felt that Capital's "on time" performance at Grand Rapids was in-
adequate. See Brief of CAB Bureau of Air Operations to Examiner, pp. 46-47.
Capital Airlines is defending on the grounds that load factors at Grand Rapids are low
in comparison with the large volume of service being provided, that additional service
would not be economically feasible, and that the pattern of service provided is designed
best to meet the community's over-all transportation needs. Brief of Capital Airlines, Inc.,
to Examiner, pp. 3-5.
128. CAB order no. E-12254, March 14, 1958. Despite this setback, Grand Rapids
has requested the hearing examiner to find that a need for a second trunkline carrier
exists, and that a prompt hearing on the matter should be instituted by the Board. Under
§ 401 (h), Grand Rapids has also filed an application for amendment of the certificate of
public convenience and necessity of Northwest, United, Trans World or American Air-
lines in its move to obtain additional trunkline service. Brief of Grand Rapids, supra note
127, at p. 54.
129. No. 8851, CAB, 1959. The initial decision of the hearing examiner has not yet
been handed down.
130. Toledo is served by Lake Central, United, Trans World, Eastern, Delta, and
Capital Airlines. OFFIcIAL AIRLINE GuIDE cols. 1100-05 (Quick Ref. ed., April 1, 1959).
131. In September 1953, Capital accounted for 15.6% of the traffic between Toledo
and its four principal markets. In the same month in 1957, Capital accounted for only
3%. Exhibits of City of Toledo and the Toledo Chamber of Commerce, Ex. No. Tol-6,
Toledo Adequacy of Service Investigation, No. 8851, CAB, Dec. 3, 1,958.
132. Id. at 14-16. "[T]he fact that Toledo's traffic potential has not been realized and
that its traffic, particularly in its principal markets, has not experienced normal growth
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inducing its competitors to curtail their level of service.'33 Toledo therefore
raises the complex question whether section 404(a)'s "adequate service" man-
date encompasses a failure to compete in a multi-carrier community.
Greensboro. One of the two categories of discrimination proscribed by sec-
tion 404(b) was at issue in the Greensboro, North Carolina, case. 34 Alleged-
ly, a proposed route-certificate amendment preferred one community over
another. The route at issue (limited to the relevant cities) was that flown by
Eastern Airlines from Miami to Charlotte, N.C., to Greensboro, to Charles-
ton, W. Va., and then to Detroit. Eastern petitioned the CAB for permission
to add Toledo and Columbus, Ohio, as intermediate stops on this route be-
yond Charleston. The hearing examiner authorized the proposed extension
only on direct flights between Charlotte and Detroit; as a result, service by
Eastern between Greensboro and the added points was precluded. 3 5 Greens-
boro claimed that "splitting" Eastern's route at Charlotte gave that city an
illegal preference and worked an unjustified discrimination against Greens-
boro.136 The CAB's final decision, affirmed on appeal, stated that the discrimi-
nation which the new route occasioned was balanced by accompanying public
benefits, that Charlotte surpassed Greensboro in need for and probable use of
the added service, and that no particular competitive relationship was shown
to exist between the two cities. 137 Accordingly, the extension was authorized.
rates is traceable to the absence of effective competition." Id. at 15-16. The number of
passengers between Toledo and its four principal markets increased only 1.4% between
1955 and 1957, while the overall national growth of air traffic increased 23.9%. Id. at 15.
And Toledo's income and population increase was above the national average. Id. at 7.
133. During 1955-57, traffic in Toledo increased 1.4% while service from Toledo to
the four major market areas over which Toledo was most concerned declined 25 to 100%.
Exhibits of City of Toledo, Toledo Adequacy of Service Investigation, No. 8851, CAB,
Dec. 3, 1958, pp. 14-15.
134. Reopened Charleston-Columbus Case, IA Av. L. REP. ff 22153 (CAB Jan. 16,
1958), aff'd sub noma. Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority v. CAB, 262 F.2d 689
(D.C. Cir. 1958).
135. Prior to the proceedings before the hearing examiner, both Charlotte and Ra-
leigh-Durham, North Carolina, were denied leave to intervene on the grounds that their
interests would not be affected; however, they were allowed to participate informally
under rule 14 of the Board's Rules of Practice. Order Granting and Denying Interven-
tion, GAB Order No. E-7980, Dec. 18, 1953.
136. Greensboro had intervened after the hearing examiner's decision. Order Grant-
ing Intervention, CAB Order No. E-8673, Sept. 30, 1954. Greensboro then appeared at
the oral argument before the CAB and raised the issue of discrimination. The Board,
however, affirmed the.decision of the hearing examiner, Charleston, W. Va. and Colum-
bus, Ohio, Case, Av. L. REP. (1954-57 CAB Cas.) 1 21795 (1955). Greensboro's petition
for rehearing was denied. Order Denying Petition for Reconsideration, CAB Order No.
E-9015, March 14, 1954.
137. After the Board affirmed the hearing examiner's decision, Greensboro appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Board's
decision was reversed on the grounds that Greensboro had not received an answer to its
charge of discrimination; that this issue was relevant to the Board's ultimate decision as
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The Board's decision is conclusive, however, only as to discrimination au-
thorized in the amended certificate; if Eastern subsequently gives Charlotte
preferential service unrelated to the approved route, Greensboro may file a
complaint against the airline charging a different section 404(b) violation-
operational discrimination.
138
The Fort Worth Case
Clearly the most significant of the recent CAB decisions, the Fort Worth
Investigation 130 fuses many elements of the Toledo and Greensboro contro-
versies. A multi-carrier community there combined a section 404(b) charge
of discrimination with a section 404(a) allegation of inadequate service. Fort
Worth did not attack a particular carrier but instead challenged the service
provided by all its authorized airlines.140 Under section 404(b), Fort Worth
claimed that every carrier certificated to serve both Forth Worth and Dallas
concentrated its flights at the Dallas airport and thereby unduly preferred
to what public convenience and necessity required; and that failure to answer the claim
of discrimination would prejudice Greensboro in its effort to obtain judicial review.
Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority v. CAB, 231 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The
Board then reopened the proceeding for further hearings and presentation of evidence
before a hearing examiner. Reopened Charleston-Columbus Case, 1.A Av. L. REP. 1122153,
at 14060 (CAB Jan. 16, 1958). The examiner had found, inter alia, that Charlotte sub-
stantially outweighed Greensboro in economic importance and in need for the service in
question, that no particular competitive relationship existed between Charlotte and Greens-
boro, that Greensboro had no need for service to Columbus and Toledo, and that provid-
ing direct service to Columbus from Greensboro would occasion substantial diversion
from and increased subsidy need for the local carrier presently serving the route. Id. at
14060-61. The Board adopted the hearing examiner's findings and stated that Greensboro's
competitive relationship did not transcend the ordinary type of latent competition between
most cities in the country; that there would be no substantial adverse effect upon Greens-
boro if Eastern's route were split at Charlotte; and that, even if two cities possessed
the same traffic potential, discrimination could be justified by geographical integration
with the serving carrier's route structure. Id. at 14060-65. Upon a second appeal, the
Board's decision was affirmed. Greensboro-High Point Airport 'Authority v. CAB, 262
F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Compare Fort Worth Investigation, No. 7382, CAB, Sept.
23, 1958, p. 33 n.52 (dissimilarity in economic activity tends to minimize the importance
of a competitive relationship).
'138. Cf. Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority, 231 F.2d 517, 521 (D.C. Cir.
1956). In Application of Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority for Additional Air
Service, No. 6880, CAB, 1959, Greensboro has alleged that the trunkline service at the
local airport is not adequate and is discriminatory. The application has not been set for
hearing. QUFSTIONNARE.
139. Fort Worth Investigation, IA Av. L. REP. 11 22205 (OAB Sept. 23, 1958). The
opinion was fully reprinted in the CAB mimeograph opinion and extracted in the CCH
Aviatioa Law Reporter. Citations will be to the Aviation Law Reporter whenever pos-
sible and to the mimeographed opinion, CAB Dkt. No. 7382, when that is the only source.
140. The issues as framed by the Board were whether "any" carrier had failed to
provide adequate service, and whether "any" carrier should by appropriate order be com-
pelled to comply with § 404(a). No. 7382, CAB, Sept. 23, 1958, app. 1.
1227
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
that city. 41 The Board refused to decide the discrimination issue, 42 but it
did utter significant dicta on the interrelationship of sections 404(a) ("ade-
quate service") and 404(b) ("discrimination"). The CAB stated that, while
inadequate service and discriminatory practices were distinct concepts and one
could exist without the other,143 discrimination might be indicative of inade-
quacy. Therefore, the Board said, in assessing the section 404(a) require-
ments of a particular community, it would consider the quality of air trans-
portation typically available to similar communities. 4 4 Still, the Board cau-
tioned, even if two communities were identical in all respects, a difference in
service levels would not by itself demonstrate inadequacy, since operations at
the favored city might be more than adequate. The CAB then laid down a
more far-reaching rule-that the air services of two communities, however
proximate, will not be compared when their economic structure and traffic
potential are significantly dissimilar.14 5 Finally, the Board noted, the benefit
accruing to one city from flights at a neighboring community should be con-
sidered in determining whether service is adequate, and should be deemed
to offset, if not negate, the discriminatory nature of disproportionate service
attacked under section 404(b). 146
Turning to the section 404(a) issue in Fort Worth, the Board construed
that section to impose only a minimum standard of service, that is, to require
the reasonable accommodation of existent traffic demand .1 4 7 Hence, the fewer
arriving and departing passengers an airport has per day, the greater freedom
141. See Brief for Fort Worth to the Examiner, p. 31, Fort Worth Investigation,
1A Av. L. REP. 1 22205 (CAB Sept. 23, 1958). Dallas and Fort Worth are approximate-
ly thirty-one miles apart and are served by two airports. Amon Carter Field (Fort Worth
International Airport) is nineteen miles from both Fort Worth and Dallas; Love Field
(Dallas) is eight miles from Dallas and thirty-one miles from Fort Worth. No. 7382,
CAB, Sept. 23, 1.958, app. 3, 13. Carter is only six years old, is strategically located be-
tween the two cities, and is claimed to be a superior airport. See Brief for Fort Worth
to the Examiner, pp. 6-7, 21-22, supra.
142. 1A Av. L. REP. 1 22205, at 14203.
143. For instance, a city whose services are legally adequate might nevertheless be
the object of discrimination in favor of another city which enjoys an undue or
unreasonable advantage over it in service; conversely, service at a city might be
legally inadequate even if its only significant competitor suffers from similarly in-
adequate service.
No. 7382, CAB, Sept. 23, 1958, p. 32 n.51.
144. Id. at 32-33. See also Reopened Charleston-Columbus Case, 1A Av. L. REP.
1f 22153, at 14064 (CAB Jan. 16, 1958).
.145. 1 Av. L. REP. ff 22205, at 14204.
146. "[W]hile continuous improvements at Love, unmatched by proportionate changes
at Carter, might in time result in disproportionate benefits to Dallas of a discriminatory
nature, they would also confer substantial benefits on Fort Worth and accordingly would
tend to advance rather than detract from the adequacy of Fort Worth's service ..
Ibid. But see note 188 infra.
147. 1 Av. L. REP. 1 22205, at 14201. In discussing adequacy, the Board examined
separately the various routes which Fort Worth charged were inadequately served. Each
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a carrier has in legally curtailing operations. Nonetheless, recognizing the
temporary nature of adequacy, the Board also observed that sufficient service
may become inadequate if future deterioration is not warranted by reduced
traffic, or if an airline fails to correlate improved service with community
expansion. 148 Still, "adequate service" emerged from the Fort Worth decision
merely as a safeguard against poor service, and not as a standard facilitating
the local development of air transportation. 1 49 Section 404(a) is of no avail,
therefore, unless an actual insufficiency can be demonstrated. It is bootless to
show no more than the feasibility of a proposed improvement in service, or
the benefits which improvement would bring.150
In applying its limited interpretation of section 404(a), the CAB rejected
Fort Worth's request for a finding of across-the-board inadequacy, and held
that "adequate service" must always be appraised destination by destination. 5 '
The Board also stated that the legal sufficiency of a given carrier's service
cannot be determined by considering that carrier's operations alone. Rather,
to ascertain whether the demand for air transportation to a particular market
is being met satisfactorily, the CAB will review in the aggregate not only the
services furnished by all of a complainant community's authorized carriers
but also the flights scheduled from any readily accessible neighboring air-
port. 5 2 Moreover, according to the Board, the "adequate service" standard
does not oblige a carrier to furnish express or limited-stop or through flights,
provided such flights are available on another airline at either the local or a
nearby airport. 5 3 Even if an allegedly dilatory carrier received its initial grant
of authority because it was expected to provide a competitive stimulant, its
indolence is excusable when other airlines dominate the market and absorb all
available traffic. The terms of the noncompeting airline's initial grant are not
defeated, the Board reasons, because that airline is in effect a residual rival
able to re-enter the market with vigor should the established carriers fail to
provide service responsive to the public's needs.' 54 Thus, if the complex of
was considered in terms of satisfactory accommodation of demand. For example, the
Board noted that the level of service maintained by Delta between Fort Worth and New
Orleans was "ample" on the basis of surveys and estimated demand. Id. at 14200-01.
148. Id. at 14201. The Board stated, however, that deterioration was not tantamount
to inadequacy, for surrounding circumstances might warrant a decline in the quantity or
quality of a particular service. No. 7382, CAB, Sept. 23, 1958, p. 20 n.24.
149. Id. at 20.
150. 1 Av. L. REP. ff 22205, at 14201. "In other words the adequacy requirement does
not automatically come into play merely because an improvement could be justified." No.
7382, CAB, Sept. 23, 1958, pp. 20-21.
151. "[W]e mean that if inadequacy cannot be found in particular markets, no find-
ing of general inadequacy in the city's service can be made." 1 Av. L. REP. [ 22205, at
14199.
152. Id. at 14200.
153. Ibid. If, however, the inadequacy were of a "positive or affirmative sort," such
as bad food, undependability, or discourteous treatment, the services of another carrier
would be irrelevant. Ibid.
154. No. 7382, CAB, Sept. 23, 1958, pp. 10-11.
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flights flown by all carriers from all geographically related airports (for ex-
ample, Fort Worth and Dallas) provides an area with adequate air transpor-
tation, no one carrier can be held to violate section 404(a) regardless of its
level of operations. 155
The Fort Worth doctrine ignores the community's objective of promoting
traffic potential. Under that doctrine, carriers need serve only actual traffic,
and need not develop increased demand through a more extended pattern of
air transportation.156 The CAB emphasized that the level of service at Fort
Worth was sufficient because the airlines could accommodate the average
number of enplaned passengers per day on the routes in question. 1r7 While
based on accurate statistics, this conclusion minimizes the fact that better ser-
vice at the Dallas airport was attracting Fort Worth traffic which would board
locally were flights available)15 Furthermore, irrespective of the other airport,
155. "The protection of the public's right to adequate air service between two places
that are authorized to be linked by competing carriers does not require that each car-
rier's service in itself be enough to meet the public's needs, but rather that the aggregate
of services offered between the two points be adequate to do so." 1 Av. L. REP. ff 22205,
at 14200.
A second § 404 case, Washington-Baltimore Adequacy of Serv. Investigation, No.
8148, CA&B, 1959, is now awaiting Board decision. Oral argument was had on November
6-7, 1958. Baltimore has charged serving carriers with inadequate service in violation of
§ 404(a) and with transgressing § 404(,b) by unjustly discriminating against Baltimore
in favor of nearby Washington. The carriers involved are Alleghany, American, Capital,
Delta, Eastern, National, Northeast, Trans World, and United Airlines. The Baltimore
litigation is substantially similar, both legally and factually, to the Fort Worth case.
Each city has charged "across-the-board" inadequacy on the part of all the serving air-
lines, and the issues of adequacy and discrimination involve the services at a nearby air-
port. Thus, the CAB will have an opportunity to reappraise the doctrines announced in
Fort Worth. For further discussion of the Baltimore case, see notes 159, 164, 173, 193
infra.
156. "['M]ore must be shown in support of a complaint thereunder [§ 404(a)] than
to point to desired improvements in service that might confer substantial benefits and to
show a plausible manner in which their advent might be effected ... " 1 Av. L. RE.
ff 22205, at 14201.
157. No. 7382, CAB, Sept. 23, 1958, pasim.
158. Fort Worth contended that the loss of Fort Worth passengers to Dallas seriously
prejudiced the economy of Fort Worth, and that local facilities catering to travelers and
visitors were losing business, particularly the trade of those whose destination was Fort
Worth, to Dallas. Brief of Fort Worth to the Board, pp. 25-28. The hearing examiner
concluded that about 38% of "true" Fort Worth passengers enplane or deplane at the
Dallas airport. No. 7382, CAB, Sept. 23, 1958, app. 13. The Board conceded that the evi-
dence supported Fort Worth's contentions, but stated that service at the Dallas airport
was "reasonably available" and "highly attractive, thereby according Fort Worth an im-
portant supplemental service." 1 Av. L. REP. 1 22205, at 14198. Moreover, the Board noted
that a substantial number of Dallas passengers use the Fort Worth Airport. No. 7382,
CAB, Sept. 23, 1958, p. 4. This observation overlooks the fact that, because of the distance
involved, see note 141 supra, few Dallas passengers deplaning at the Fort Worth airport
would patronize Fort Worth travel facilities, while many deplaning Fort Worth passen-
gers would use Dallas hotels and shops.
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bad service at Fort Worth would induce many potential air travelers to use
surface transportation. 159 In fact, the Board's reasoning would countenance a
vicious downward spiral: poor service discouraging patronage, less patronage
justifying curtailed operations, reduced operations lowering demand still fur-
ther until the airlines are serving only those travelers to whom air transpor-
tation is indispensable. 160 The Fort Worth test is, in sum, public necessity,
not public convenience.''
The Fort Worth case also distorts section 404(a)'s explicit directive that
"every air carrier" provide "adequate service." In most air markets, the
Board's aggregate-service approach effectively relieves the airlines of individ-
,159. "It . . . appears . . . that a substantial demand for air transportation existed
in this area, and that the number of persons 'who actually presented themselves to ap-
plicant for transportation is no true index of the number of persons who might have
presented themselves had the applicant not curtailed its operation. so drastically." Air-
line Feeder System, Inc., Grandfather Certificate, 1 C.AA. 167, 171 (1939). (Emphasis
added.)
In the Washington-Baltimore Adequacy of Service Investigation, No. 8148, CAB, 1959,
Baltimore has charged that its poor traffic development is the direct result of the poor
volume of service supplied. Compare Israel, Television Editorial, The Opportunity at
Friendship Airport, WJZ-TV, Baltimore, MVd., Dec. 10, 1958 (Baltimore passengers use
Washington Airport because of poor local service). The carriers, on the other hand, con-
tend that Baltimore is receiving bad service because of inadequate demand. Whatever
the reason, traffic is definitely decreasing. In the first half of 1958, airline departures in
Baltimore amounted to 8,913; in the first half of 1957, 9,218. Brief of the Greater Balti-
more Committee to the Board, p. 6, No. 8148, CAB, 1959.
160. The CAB has tacitly conceded that demand will increase as service is improved.
In the Seven States Area Investigation, IA Av. L. REP. IT 22226 (CAB Dec. 8, 1958),
the Board replaced a trunk carrier-Western Airlines-with a feeder line-'Frontier-
because the Board felt that local service carriage was better adapted to the needs of the
communities in question. In so doing, the CAB noted that more frequent flights and
better-timed schedules would double the amount of traffic which had enplaned during
Western's tenure. Western agreed. No. 7454, CAB, Dec. 8, 1958, p. 7 & n.'13.
Responding to the Questionnaire, one city pointed out that its air service was ade-
quate primarily because the serving carrier was scheduling its flights to major destina-
tion points at opportune times. As a result, usage has been "splendid." QuESTIONNAiRE.
Obviously, if a carrier furnishes one flight a day at 3:00 A.M., it will accommodate the
people willing to board at such an early hour. Still, this does not mean that service at
more reasonable hours will not generate demand far in excess of present levels.
161. Compare Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Public Serv. Conmi'n, 130 Kan. 777, 783,
288 Pac. 755, 759 (1930) (necessity does not mean something indispensable or something
that is absolutely essential, but rather a public need, without which the public-the people
generally of the community-would be inconvenienced or handicapped to their detriment
in pursuance of business or wholesome pleasure as compared with that engaged in 'by
others generally, similarly located).
One eastern airport manager, claiming his city to be the second fastest growing com-
munity in the United States, stated that trunkline service had been steadily decreasing
because the carriers found it more convenient to force the area's air travelers to utilize
service at a larger, neighboring community. "[I]t's for the convenience of the carriers
that our service is inadequate. This is the iutional trend." QutsEIO NRE.
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ual responsibility for inadequate operations.162 Only the single-carrier com-
munity lacking access to any airport but its own is unaffected by Fort Worth;
its burden of proof in 404(a) proceedings remains limited to demonstrating
the serving airline's inadequacies. But any city located near another com-
munity's airport must prove both local and adjacent operations inadequate,
even if both involve the same carrier. And a multi-carrier community-served
through local and/or neighboring airports-must demonstrate cumulatively
deficient service in order to sustain section 404(a) charges. Inadequacy is thus
geared to aggregate service, and the community has a heavy burden of
proof.163 Were this burden met, the Board would face as yet unsolved prob-
lems in framing a remedial compliance order which would both apportion
blame among the respondent carriers and effectuate adequate service.'" Final-
ly, Fort Worth may operate in the future to harm carrier-community rela-
tions, since a city which would attack the operations of some of its airlines
must now subject them all to CAB investigation. 16 5
Fort Worth further reduces the airlines' section 404(a) obligations by re-
lieving an authorized competitor of the duty to exploit its certificate grant
aggressively.166 Here, the Board's premise-that the latent rival constitutes a
162. "While such Braniff service would be plainly inadequate in this market if it
were the only carrier serving the market, nevertheless the efforts of Braniff and the
response thereto of Fort Worth travellers demonstrate that Braniff's service is adequate
to meet the needs of the public in view of the additional services operated by American."
1 Av. L. REP. 1[ 22205, at 14199-200.
The act speaks of aggregate service only in terms of providing "through service ...
in connection with other air carriers." Section 404(a) of the act.
,163. Since carriers have great freedom in changing schedules, Board consideration
of the operating levels of all carriers is illusory. Flights might be increased until a Board
determination of adequacy is made, and then decreased, forcing the community once again
to undertake the arduous prosecution of a § 404(a) charge. Cf. Eastern Airlines, Inc.-
Memphis-Greenville Operation, 4 C.AjB. 429, 431. (1943) (schedules in operation at any
one time not criteria of adequate service since subject to change).
164. See Fort Worth Investigation, No. 7382, CAB, Sept. 23, 1958, p. 10 n.11; Wash-
ington-Baltimore Adequacy of Serv. Investigation, No. 8148, CAB, 1959. Baltimore is
contesting the fact that, even though the initial decision of the hearing examiner fully
accepted the overall inadequacy of Baltimore's air service, the air transportation in in-
dividual Baltimore markets was found to be adequate. "Can the whole partake of a dif-
ferent quality than the parts? We think not, and we submit that the Board should reject
the ultimate defeatism of the Initial Decision and should approach seriously the task-
admittedly not simple-of devising an effective remedy.' Brief on Behalf of the Greater
Baltimore Committee to the Board, p. 28.
165. Of course, those carriers not serving the markets at issue would not be involved.
166. One commentator has recently noted that, after competitive service has been
authorized, the Board typically exercises -no formal enforcement action with respect to
how vigorously the new carrier competes, how effective its service is, or indeed, whether
it inaugurates service at all. Richmond, Creating Competition. Anwng Airlines, 24 J. AIR
L. & Com. 435, 436-37 (1957).
Replies to the Questionnaire demonstrate a correlation between effective competition
and adequate service. Of the twenty-four cities deeming air service adequate, only two
state that competition should be increased; of the forty-four denominating existent opera-
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threat to established carriers-is fallacious. As the Toledo case pointedly
demonstrates, a carrier's indolence on short hops usually stems from its pur-
suit of long-haul, major-market traffic.' 67 Since an incentive to serve the
smaller community is therefore lacking, established carriers would scarcely
regard the threat of re-entry as endangering their market position. Moreover,
as Toledo also illustrates, a decrease in alternative service available to the
public enables serving airlines to reduce the quality and number of their
flights. The number of passengers flown may remain unchanged, but they are
not served as well.'6 8 Latent competition, then, whatever its efficacy in other
areas, is clearly an inappropriate doctrine in the context of air transporta-
tion.1 0
As regards discrimination, the Fort Worth (and Greensboro) gloss on
section 404(b)-to the effect that disproportional service is irrelevant when
geographically related communities have different economic structures-in
effect expunges that section from the act. Though invariably engaged in busi-
ness rivalry, neighboring cities are economically identical only by coincidence.
Consequently, an unjustified disparity in air service irrationally upsets the
competitive balance between nearby cities attempting to attract new industries,
exploit existing resources, and develop tourist and convention trade. The
tions inadequate, twenty-one assert that more effective competition is needed. E.g.: "[I]n-
crease in competition would improve service and promote business." "One main factor
contributing to inadequate service is the absence of competitive service 'between trunk-
lines now serving...." QUESTIONNARE.
167. While Capital was curtailing its service to Toledo, see notes 131-32 supra, it
increased its systemwide operation 100% in the period 1955-58. Most of the increase was
in the New York-Chicago and Washington-Chicago markets. See Exhibits of the City of
Toledo, Toledo Adequacy of Service Investigation, No. 8851, CAB, 1959, Exhibit No. 17.
One of the collateral effects of the equipment and scheduling demands of carrier com-
petition in major-market areas has been the reduction of service to intermediate points.
GILL & BATES 126-31.
168. See note 133 supra.
169. GILL & BATEs 15 (effective competition exists only if carriers influence services
offered to or rates charged the air traveler). See United Air Lines Transp. Corp.-
Acquisition of Western Air Express Corp., 1 C.A.A. 739, 747 (1940) (intensity of com-
petition not to be confused with the mere existence of a competitive situation); Fort
Worth Investigation, No. 7382, CAB, Sept. 23, 1958, p. -1 (unused authorization furnishes
no economic strength) (concurring and dissenting opinion) ; Boston-New York-'Atlanta-
New Orleans Case, 9 ,C.A.B. 38, 49 (.1948) (evidence proves that development of traffic
potential improves under the impact of competition). Compare Great Lakes-Southeast
Serv. Case, IA Av. L. REP. IT 22211, at 14225 (CAB Sept. 30, 1958) (monopoly and two-
carrier communities are usually underscheduled because of lack of effective competition).
In this case, the Board also noted that authorizing an effective competitor would have
a long-range impact on adequacy, but that the mere threat of competition would at best
improve service temporarily. No. 2396, CAB, Sept. 30, 1958, p. 17.
Numerous Questionnaire statements also indicate the effect of decreased competition.
E.g.: "Due to the lack of effective competition, the service by certificated air carriers
has lagged far behind the improvement in service out of [a nearby city] . . . where there
is effective competition." "[C]ompetition is nil and service reflects this ..
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CAB's decisions nevertheless permit airlines to discriminate against a city so
as to jeopardize its relative market position.' 70  Worse, if two economically
equivalent cities are in close geographical proximity, the CAB's construction
of the section 404(a)-404(b) relationship can prevent the disfavored city
from remedying unsatisfactory service. Under the Fort Worth rationale, when
serving carriers provide disproportionately augmented service to one of two
neighboring communities, the other community's service is enhanced rather
than diminished by operations at the favored airport.171- Hence, the Board
would allow airline partiality to injure a given city's enterprises catering to
the traveling public, and to force a locality's traffic into using a distant air-
port.
7 2
THECAB AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: A PROPOSAL
In viewing "adequate service" from the standpoint of a community's mini-
mum needs rather than an individual carrier's statutory responsibilities, the
CAB has ignored explicit language in the Civil Aeronautics Act and preferred
the airlines' interests over those of the public.173 Of course, every city is not
1.70. Furthermore, if the Board adheres to its earlier announced policy requiring a
community to proceed under § 404 (b) rather than under § 401 (h), an aggrieved city may
be barred from seeking the services of an additional carrier to alleviate the injurious
effects of discrimination. See Boston-New York-Atlanta-New Orleans Case, 9 C.A.B.
38,47 (1948).
1171. Disagreeing with this rationale, thirteen cities report that their serving carriers
are subjecting them to unjustified discrimination. Of these, twelve state that their service
is inadequate. QUESTIONNAIRE.
If the Board's aggregate-service rationale is carried to its logical conclusion, a city
alleging carrier discrimination must demonstrate that the total air service from the com-
plainant city to a particular market is unduly out of balance when compared with the
total air service of the neighboring community to the same market.
172. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 1 C.A.A. 778, 789 (1940) ("A city receiving
a minimum of air service cannot be expected to develop a large volume of long-haul
traffic when there are, within a short distance, other cities having a greater frequency of
schedules.") ; see American Airlines, Inc., 2 C.'A.B. 436, 442 (1941) ; Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 2 C.A.B. 676, 680 (1941).
The Board may have presaged its Fort Worth and Greensboro holdings by dictum in
the Philadelphia-Transatlantic Serv. Case, Av. L. Rm. (1951-54 CAB Cas.) 11 21454, at
16393 (1952) : "[A] conclusion that any prejudice which might exist against Philadelphia
is undue or unreasonable would subject the Board to a flood of complaints from munici-
palities that do not receive as much service as other communities of comparable size re-
gardless of the need for service to such points." See also Reopened Charleston-Columbus
Case, 1A Av. L. REi. ff 22153, at 14063 (CAB Jan. 16, 1958).
173. Speaking of the certification process in general, a former chairman of the CAB
said: "I feel that there has been an undue shift of emphasis from public convenience and
necessity to the seeking and protection of private carrier rights." Rizley, Some Personal
Reflections After Eight Months as Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, 22 J. Aia
L. & Com. 445, 450 (1955). One airport official, noting the CAB's dissimilar treatment
of carrier applications and community petitions, states: "The CAB will quickly do what
it can if a carrier asks for something, but will side-step the issues when communities
ask for something." QUESTIONNAIR& But see United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 198 F.2d
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necessarily entitled to all the air service it deems desirable. Still, a community
which is able to generate demand and support additional operations should
also be able to secure flights commensurate with its traffic potential. The same
public convenience and necessity which warrant the authorization of first-car-
rier or competitive service also dictate that a certificated airline maintain sub-
stantial operations.174 Having reaped the advantages of controlled competition
and government subsidy,175 the trunklines should serve all communities, not
just large commercial areas. 176 True, the swift development of an air network
linking the nation's population centers is a desirable goal; but the attainment
of this goal ought not and need not render other areas of the country aerially
inaccessible. The CAB should therefore require the trunklines to devote more
attention to traffic outside the long-haul market until feeder lines can provide
a comprehensive pattern of air transportation for smaller communities. 77 At
100, 107 (7th Cir. 1952) (public rather than carrier interest should control); Middle
Atlantic Area Case (Pittsburgh), 10 C.A.B. 257, 266 (1949) (similar).
In the Washington-Baltimore Adequacy of Serv. Investigation, No. 8148, CAB, 1959,
the hearing examiner excused the performance of Capital Airlines on the ground that the
company had operational and financial problems. Taking exception to this, Baltimore
asserts: "[W]e know of no theory whereby the obligation of a common carrier, whether
common-law or statutory, can be disregarded 'because of internal problems of a company,
fancied or actual." Brief of the Greater Baltimore Committee to the Board, p. 17.
174. [A] service is not necessarily adequate because the community . .. can conduct
its business without further or additional service. To be adequate, they must safe-
guard the people generally from appreciable inconvenience in the pursuit of their
business .... [I]f a new or enlarged service will enhance the public welfare, in-
crease its opportunities, or stimulate its economic, social, intellectual or spiritual
life to the extent that the patronage received will justify the expense of rendering
it, the old service is not adequate.
Mulcahy v. Public Serv. Comm., 117 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1941).
175. Commercial aviation in the United States owes its origin, growth, development,
and present structure to planning and financing by the federal government. REPoRT N
AIRLINEs 8. See Smith, Government Policy Concerning Airline Subsidy, 25 J. AIR L. &
Com. 79 (1958).
176. Service to Springfield, Mass., 11 C.A.B. 747, 749 (1950) (interest to be served
is national, not that of any particular area or community); Hector, Problems in Eco-
nomic Regulation of Civil Aviation in the United States, 26 .T. AIR L. & Com. 101, 105
(1959) ("There are certain duties . . . which the government must always enforce under
the statute. First, the carriers must give adequate service to all communities to which
they are certificated.") (Hector is a Member of the CAB and was a dissenter in the
Fort Worth case).
177. See Seven States Area Investigation, 1A Av. L. REP. ff 22226, at 14304 (CAB
Dec. 8, 1958) ; Netterville, Local Service Airlines: Trunkline Suspensions in Aid of the
Local Service Experiment, 26 So. CAL. L. REv. 229 (1953). A large midwestern city
reports: "Several years ago, American Airlines gave up hedge-hop service between De-
troit and several cities to a local service carrier and with the increased service by the
local service carrier, it has proved beneficial to all concerned." QUESTIONNAre. Another
city asserts that the growth of local-service carriers has helped to offset poor air service
resulting from its small population. Ibld. Immediate large-scale abandonment of the
smaller cities to the local-service carriers is not advisable, however. Such abandonment
1235
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the same time, the feeders should not be allowed to operate as small-scale
trunklines in derogation of their certificate obligations. 1, In this way, both
trunk and feeder lines can be made to provide service realistically geared to
the needs of cities which are not major centers of commerce.
To implement these objectives, the CAB should replace the Fort Worth
concept of "adequate service" with one requiring every air carrier to partici-
pate actively in the promotion of local air travel. 79 Thus, an airline holding
a monopoly on a community's air carriage would be required to maintain
operations sufficient not only to accommodate existing traffic but to develop
latent demand as well. °80 And, when more than one airline serves a city, each
carrier would have to provide enough service so that the competitive thrust
of its presence could be felt. 181 Token or nonexistent operations would be
would necessitate a large increase in subsidy, as these carriers are not yet self-sufficient.
See note 71 supra.
178. See Adams, Future of the Local Service Carriers-Public Service vs. Federal
Subsidy, 23 J. AIR L. & Com. 127, 138 (1956); note 73 supra and accompanying text.
In serving some communities, local-service airlines may encounter competition from the
nonscheduled carriers. These carriers generally attract the most profitable traffic-mili-
tary personnel, tourist business and the like-so that the feeders find it harder to serve
a given area profitably. See note 73 supra. Accordingly, the CAB should maintain its
present rigid restrictions on the number of flights flown by irregular and supplemental
carriers. See generally Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation, 1A Av. L. REP. ff22247
('CAB Jan. 28, 1959).
179. "Adequate service is a relative expression which has been construed to mean
only that such facilities must be supplied as might be fairly demanded.... This service
is but the minimum standard fixed by the Act but the considerations of national policy
require much more." Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc., Additional North-South Calif.
Serv., 4 C.A.B. 373, 375 (1943) (dictum). See also Southwest-Northeast Serv. Case,
Av. L. REP. (1954-57 CAB Cas.) ff 21892, at 14493 (1955). For a vivid discussion of the
results obtained from "promotional" scheduling, see Cook, North Central Mass-Schedudes
Traffic, Aviation Week, Feb. 16, 1959, p. 38.
180. Compare Northwest Airlines, Inc., Mail Rates, 1 C.A.A. 275, 284 (1939) (single-
carrier adequacy subsumes frequent departures and sufficient capacity to meet the con-
venience of commerce). Frequent departures would prevent a monopolist from exploiting
his position and restricting flights in order to increase his per-trip load factor.
181. Now that air transportation has progressed to an established industry status,
where domestic certificated carriers for the most part no longer need subsidy sup-
port, and where continued growth of the industry is predicted on all sides, it is
incumbent upon the Board to take the steps necessary to assure that all elements
of the certificated industry are placed in a position to offer viable competition to
their rivals.
REPORT ON AIRLNES 113. "[T]he Board should be directed to consider, in its determina-
tion of the public interest, convenience and necessity, competition 'to the extent prac-
ticable' rather than the present test, 'to the extent necessary.'" Id. at 267. For a discus-
sion of the need for competitive service even when established carriers are maintaining
adequate operations, see THoMAs 89.
Once the airlines are compelled to compete, economic self-interest will force them to
furnish a varied pattern of flights, which should in turn promote increased passenger
traffic. See GILL & BATES 624-28; Hector, smpra note 176, at 105. If a carrier does not
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precluded, but a competing carrier would not have to maintain the same level
of operations as would one enjoying a local monopoly. 8 2 Holding every non-
monopoly carrier to standards of actual competition would enable complainants
to institute proceedings against laggard carriers only, would make it easier
for a community to demonstrate insufficient service, and would facilitate the
formulation of CAB remedies. Most important, the downward spiral of air
service permitted by the Fort Worth doctrine of adequacy would be reversed
through effective competition.8 3 On the other hand, no carrier should be com-
pelled to promote increased air travel in the face of a community's proved
unresponsiveness. 8 4 If an airline's attempts to develop new traffic are frus-
trated by the public's apathy, the airline may be justified in curtailing opera-
tions. A reduction in air transportation cannot be avoided if a community fails
to support sufficiently adequate service to activate latent passenger demand.
Abandonment of the cumulative-service doctrine alone will not link "ade-
quate service" to community potential; the CAB must also cease viewing
neighboring airports as an aggregate. 8 5 Unlike a satellite community such
as Pasadena, California, a city which forms the nucleus of an independent
traffic-generating area-Fort Worth or Baltimore, for example-is not receiv-
ing adequate service if its traffic is forced to patronize a nonlocal airport.
8 6
Indeed, when passing on applications for certificates, the CAB recognizes that
in fact compete after being authorized to do so, it is either disregarding its certificate
obligations, unable to fulfill them, or in a market unable to support competitive service.
Fort Worth Investigation, No. 7382, CAB, Sept. 23, 1958, p. 2 (concurring and dissent-
ing opinion). When lack of competition in a particular market is a product of a carrier's
deliberate neglect, either a compliance order should issue or its grant of authority should
be withdrawn and another carrier substituted. See ibid. But see Ryan, The Revocation of
an Airline Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, 15 J. AIR L. & Com. 377, 388
(1948) (CAB has power to revoke a certificate only upon finding a "wilful" violation
of the act, although "suspension" is permissible) ; Note, 16 J. AIR L. & Com. 471, 475-82
(1949) (similar). If a failure to compete stems from an individual infirmity, withdrawal
and substitution seem to constitute the only feasible remedy. See Denver Service Case,
Av. L. REP. (1954-57 CAB Cas.) 1 21877, at 14439 (Nov. 14, 1955) ; New York-Florida
Case, Av. L. REP. (1954-57 CAB Cas.) ff 21993, at 14764, 14787 (1956). And, if traffic
clearly cannot support competitive service, the superfluous carrier should be directed to
surrender its certificate. "In a general sense, competition is unusually beneficial, but it is
better to have one airline making money than two starving." QUESTIONNAIRE.
182. Cf. Great Lakes-Southeast Serv. Case, No. 2396, CAB, Sept. 30, 1958, p. 4
(concurring and dissenting opinion).
183. See Colonial Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 552, 555 (1944).
184. See text accompanying notes 196-98 infra.
185. See Fort Worth Investigation, No. 7382, CAB, Sept. 23, 1958, p. 2 (concurring
and dissenting opinion) ("Since Braniff's certificate calls for service at Fort Worth, and
as long as the Act requires adequate service by each carrier, Braniff's obligations at Fort
Worth cannot be satisfied by its service at another city or by the service of another car-
rier.").
186. In 1956, the gross ticket sales at New Haven for all carriers were more than
$2,600,000, but because of the infrequency of local flights, at the local airport, only 4%
of the tickets sold were for flights originating at New Haven. Brief of Bridgeport, New
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it should ignore the demand potential of an independently-served community
in defining the traffic radius of an adjacent city.5 7 Similarly, air transpor-
tation at a neighboring community should not be deemed a substitute for local
operations in an "adequate service" proceeding, unless economic unity rather
than geographic proximity justifies a carrier's attempt to serve two cities
through the same airport. Once the CAB has decided in certification proceed-
ings that the public convenience and necessity warrant authorized air service
at each of several local airfields, the same criteria should preclude carrier
discrimination which results in a regional airport.
8 8
In addition, the Board should ensure that competition between geographi-
cally proximate centers is not irrationally affected by the airlines' scheduling
policies. Competition should be defined functionally-in terms of whether com-
munities are seeking the same trade-and not arbitrarily, as under the CAB
test requiring substantially similar economic structures. If two cities are in fact
commercial rivals, differences in actual community need should be examined
to determine whether the service provided either is economically dispropor-
tionate. Generally, the CAB should not find that carrier benefits deriving from
discriminatory practices justify discrimination. 89 Finally, since discrimination
Haven, and New London, p. 15, Northeastern States Area Investigation, No. 6436, CAB,
1959.
Baltimore, in the Washington-Baltimore Adequacy of Serv. Investigation, No. 8148,
CAB, 1959, has charged that it has received only token air service, primarily because of
its proximity to Washington. Brief of the Greater Baltimore Committee to the Board,
p. 5. Eleven cities assert that the proximity of another airport is prejudicial to local
efforts to obtain adequate service; the neighboring airfields are an average of thirty-five
miles away. QUESTIONNAIRE. One city, totally dependent upon air service at a neighbor-
ing community's airport and unable to obtain inaugural air service, is further inconven-
ienced by the fact that limousine service to the neighboring airport is unavailable and the
taxi fare is unreasonably expensive. QUESTIONNAME.
See generally United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 1 C.A.A. 778, 789 (1940) ; American
Airlines, Inc., 2 C.A.B. 436, 442 (1941) ; Eastern Airlines, Inc., 2 C.A.B. 676, 679-80
(1941).
187. Reopened Charleston-Columbus Case, IA Av. L. REP. 1 22153, at 14062 (CAB
Jan. 16, 1958) (Greensboro not allowed to include neighboring Winston-Salem within
its traffic-generating area when attempting to demonstrate the need for additional ser-
vice, as Winston-Salem is the "core" of its own traffic-generating area and is entitled to
adequate service at its own airport).
188. See Trans-Texas Renewal Case, No. 6485, CAB, Nov. 1, 1955, pp. 11-12 ("The
Examiner found, and we agree, that the service to be provided to Dallas and to Fort
Worth should be provided through separate airports. Fort Worth is fast becoming a
center of attraction for all types of business . . .which emphasizes the need for air ser-
vice to Fort Worth.").
189. See Hawaiian Common Fares Case, 10 C.A.B. 921 (1949) (refusal to allow
decrease in rates which would have prejudiced competing cities to their economic detri-
ment). Cf. ICC v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 218 U.S. 88, 102 (1910) ("The [Interstate
Commerce] Commission was instituted to prevent discrimination between persons and
places. It would indeed be an abuse of its powers to exercise them so as to cause
either."). One city in the Pacific coast area states: "We believe . . . we are discriminated
[Vol. 68:11991238
1959] ADEQUACY OF DOMESTIC AIRLINE SERVICE
and inadequate service often co-exist, a combined section 404(a)-404(b)
complaint should compel the Board to investigate both charges.9 0
To facilitate the revision of CAB policy proposed above, the Board should
adopt a revised certification procedure. Every carrier applying for a new (or
an amended or extended) route should be required to submit a service plan
detailing the quality and approximate schedules of the minimum number of
flights which the carrier will maintain.19' The scheduled communities should
then be requested to suggest amendments to the service plan-amendments
which, after a hearing, the CAB could accept or reject. If the route certificate
is granted, the carrier should be required to inaugurate the service plan as
approved by the CAB; and failure to do so should evoke a CAB compliance
order issued upon a community's complaint.19 2 Deviations from the service
against in the attraction of tourist business by reason of the fact that carriers serving
the California market have instituted tourist excursion fares substantially lower than
regular tourist or coach fares .... We have not been able to have this situation remedied
through negotiations with the carriers and may have to resort to a formal complaint to
the Civil Aeronautics Board." QUESTIONNAIRE
190. For cases under the Interstate Commerce Act, see Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v.
United States, 335 U.fS. 573, 592-93 (1949) (discrimination not justified by promotion
of carrier interests) ; Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450, 467 (1941) (same) ;
United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 263 U.S. 515, 524 (1924) (preference based on
honest carrier intentions may nevertheless inflict undue prejudice; self-interest of carriers
may not override the requirement of equality). For other cases under the Interstate Com-
merce Act, see United States v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 333 U.S. 169 (1948) (forbidding
railroad from forcing shipper to take delivery at point on line less convenient than its
front door) ; Transfer of Passengers Through New York and Newark, 165 I.C.C. 497
(1930) (disapproval of rates and services which discriminated against one borough of
New York City in favor of another).
191. See Fort Worth Investigation, IA Av. L. REP. ff 22205 (CAB Sept. 23, 1958).
Protection of the public from unjust discrimination and mistreatment by air carriers and
their agents is one of the main economic objectives of the act. 1955 CAB ANN. REP. 11.
192. In the congressional hearings leading to the passage of the act, a former Direc-
tor of the Bureau of Air Commerce stated that, in order for a carrier to acquire a cer-
tificate, the carrier should submit a schedule showing the number of flights proposed and
the time involved. See RHYNE, THE CrvIL A. oNAUTIcs Acr ANNOTATED 101 (1.939).
Current CAB Regulations do not require such exhibits. 'See 14 C.F.R. § 201.4 (1956).
On the other hand, in past certification proceedings carriers have usually been required
to present a service operation plan, but only as evidence of their being "fit, willing and
able." See American Export Lines, Inc., 3 C.A.B. 294, 298 (1941); Delta Air Corp., 2
C.A.B. 447, 487-88 (1941); Trans-Southern Airlines, Inc., 2 C.A.B. 250, 254 (1940);
THOMAs 67. The Board has pointed out that, under ordinary circumstances, less than a
minimum of two daily round trips serving all points on a route does not constitute ser-
vice adequate to meet the needs of commerce and the postal service. Texas-Oklahoma
Case, 7 C.A.B. 481, 529 (1946).
Under current FCC Regulations, a licensed radio operator is required to maintain a
minimum operating schedule of two-thirds of the total hours it is authorized to broadcast
between 6 A.M. and 6 P.M. FCC Radio Regs., 47 C.F.R. § 3.71. (1958). See M. B. Scott,
2 F.C.C. 158 (1935) (radio license not renewed for failure to comply with minimum
operating requirements). Television broadcasters are under a similar, though less strin-
gent, obligation. FCC Radio Regs., 47 C.F.R. § 3.651 (1958).
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plan without community approval should be illegal unless preceded by CAB
investigation and consent.'9 3 Alternatively, in an appropriate case the CAB
might approve a service plan for only a limited time. Absent the plan's re-
newal on a showing that operations justified its retention, carriers could
reduce service unilaterally following the temporary period.
Utilization of the suggested service plan would not be inconsistent with the
carrier's statutory freedom to "add to or change schedules, equipment, accom-
modations, and facilities . . . as the development of the business and the
demands of the public shall require."'1 94 At present, a carrier may not revise
its operations in a manner producing an inadequate level of service. The ser-
vice-plan approach would simply define adequacy during certification proceed-
ings rather than during a retroactive investigation under section 404(a).'11
The controlling determinant-community need-would remain unaltered. Pre-
designating a standard of adequacy seems preferable to current procedures
which, pending the extended processing of a community's complaint, afford
no interim remedy for inadequate service.)96 Furthermore, once a service plan
193. In the Washington-Baltimore Adequacy of Serv. Investigation, No. 8148,
CAB, 1959, Baltimore has suggested that, if the CAB finds that carriers are rendering
inadequate service, the Board should issue an order outlining the type of service that
should be provided. Carriers should then be given 30 to 60 days to furnish schedules by
which they propose to effectuate the Board's order, Baltimore reserving the right to take
exception and suggest improvements. Once the Board deems the schedules to be in sub-
stantial compliance with their earlier order, the proposed flights are to be inaugurated
witlin 30 days. Brief of the Greater Baltimore Committee to the Board, p. 35.
194. To speed investigation of a carrier petition to alter its service plan, so as to
avoid undue hardship when maintaining the minimum level of service proves difficult,
such a petition might be given priority on the CAB docket. Alternatively priority could
be granted only to subsidized carriers. See § 405(e) of the act (now § 405(b)), provid-
ing for preferential docketing of carrier opposition to the mail schedules ordered by the
Postmaster General.
For a discussion of the procedure for obtaining the ICC approval necessary to change
or discontinue rail operations under the Transportation Act of 1958, see Freas, Some
Aspects of Transportation Regulation, 26 LC.C. PRAc. J. 6 (1958). See also Conant,
Railroad Service Discontiuances, 43 MINN. L. Ray. 275 (1958); Weissman, Railroad
Abandonments: The Competitive Ideal, id. at 251 (1958).
195. Section 401(f) of the act (now § 401(e)). Existing law is not clear on the
scope of the CAB's power to limit or restrict certificates with respect to schedules,
equipment, accommodations or facilities. See 1957 CAB ANN. Ra,. 31. In the Large
Irregular Air Carrier Investigation, No. 5132, CAB, Jan. 28, 1959, pp. 8-12, the Board
said by way of dictum that § 401(f) limits the Board's power to "restrict the perform-
ance" of authorized transportation. Nevertheless, the Board deemed itself empowered to
specify services to be rendered, for if it could not reasonably define in a certificate the
scope of required operations, it could not grant certificate authority efficiently.
Under the service-plan approach, carriers would remain at liberty to expand operations
and juggle arrival and departure hours as the needs of the community and the carrier
demand, so long as the minimum number of flights of predetermined quality-first class,
coach, non-stop-is maintained, and flights are not scheduled at unreasonable hours.
196. The Board has previously granted certificates to local-service carriers on the
condition that they stop at each point authorized on every flight to "insure adequate local
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were approved, subsequent CAB investigation would rarely be necessary ex-
cept when a carrier failed to increase its operations correlatively with a growth
in traffic demand.
1 97
An invaluable complement to the service-plan proposal would be the gen-
eral issuance of "use it or lose it" certificates. 9 8 Were these certificates the
usual concomitants of an approved service plan, a community which failed to
generate a predesignated level of traffic over a specified period of time would
suffer a reduction in the amount of service which it could command from each
carrier. In fact, the cancellation of all air service of one or more carriers might
then be warranted. Hence, a carrier would not be locked into a perpetually
unprofitable service-plan obligation, and the burden of supporting increased
operations would rest on the community which petitioned for them.199 The
resulting mutual responsibility of carrier and community would undoubtedly
encourage them to cooperate with one another.
200
CONCLUSION
Ultimate resolution of the airline-service problems confronting smaller com-
munities depends upon a choice between two competing philosophies: one, that
government control should be limited to the regulation of competition, safety,
service to all certificated points, ... to permit the carrier the utmost flexibility of opera-
tions consistent with the above, and . . . to provide the public with the fastest, most
direct, and most frequent service consistent with the above." Middle Atlantic Area Case,
10 C.A.B. 41, 45 (1949). See also North Central Case, 7 C.A.B. 639, 680 (1946) (certi-
fication granted on the "express assumption" that fully adequate service-at least two
round-trip schedules daily-be provided to each certificated point).
197. The average time between the filing of a first petition and the Board's final
opinion is 525 days; and a proceeding of large scope may take 1004. Westwood, Proce-
dure in New Route Cases before the Civil Aeronautics Board, 14 J. AIR. L. & Com. 267,
270-71 (1947).
On January 1, 1955, the Board was faced with 558 cases in various stages of proceed-
ing, and 557 cases still to be heard, some of which dated back to 1945. Rizley, Some
Personal Reflections After Eight Months as Chairman of tlhe Civil Aeronautics Board,
22 J. AIR L. & Comi. 445, 448 (1955).
198. The side effects of the service-plan proposed would be: only those carriers that
actually intend to provide more than token service to a community would apply for au-
thorization; the Board would analyze community need carefully, for, if the minimum ser-
vice to be provided is not self-supporting, subsidy payments may be needed to under-
write operations; the Board would also have to consider the impact of competition from
nonscheduled carriers on the required operations of certificated airlines, and thus would
have to evaluate an industry factor largely independent of CAB regulation.
199. See Seven States Area Investigation, 1A Av. L. REP. 1 22226 (CAB Dec. 8,
1958), discussed notes 116-19 supra and accompanying text.
200. "Too often, a smaller community which has finally gained a place on the air
map of the United States, begins to take this challenge too much for granted and after
finds itself faced with early loss of its new gotten gain." Address of Perry H. Taft,
National Airports Conference, Nov. 3, 1957. For suggestions as to what state and
municipal officials can do to encourage air travel, see Adams, Future Local Airline Ser-
vice Depends on State Support, 20 J. Am L. & Com. 403, 412-14 (1953).
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rates, and subsidy, and that the airlines should be free to serve the national
air market in a manner maximizing their profits ;201 the other, that the indus-
try has assumed the role of a quasi-public utility, and that the service it ren-
ders is therefore subject to regulation.20 2 The question, then, is whether the
public interest is better served by allowing the airlines to continue their single-
minded pursuit of large-market traffic, or by requiring them to promote less
lucrative (if not unprofitable) operations in other areas.20 3 The choice is not
an easy one, for any losses incurred in local operations must be absorbed by
both the general public-through subsidy payments-and the flying public-
through increased rates.20 4 At present, though, it would seem that the needs
of the smaller community are being unduly sacrificed in an effort to keep
rates and subsidy at a minimum, and that the national economy will benefit,
in the long run, from a more tightly-knit pattern of air operations.
20 5
201. "The community must join the airline as a partner in the promotion of the use
of the airline by its citizens. This partnership must, however, be two way. The com-
munity must periodically meet with the airline's officials to determine whether or not
the airline is truly exploiting the full air transportation potential of the community."
Address of Perry H. Taft, supra note 200. Compare Seven States Area Investigation,
1A Av. L. REP. ff 22226, at 14320-21 (CAB Dec. 8, 1958) (management expected to
search out and promptly remedy route and service deficiencies), with id., No. 7454, CAB,
Dec. 8, 1958, pp. 136-37 (cities responsible for ensuring that actual use of air service lives
up to expectations, and that required traffic is developed).
202. See Hector, Problems in Economic Regulation of Civil Aviation in the United
States, 26 J. AIR L. & Com. 101, 106 (1959).
203. See THoMAs at iv.
204. Two commentators doubt whether the trunklines will in fact incur heavy losses
by serving small towns. "The more logical conclusion is merely that these towns do not
contribute as much to the profitable operation of the company as large towns." Maclay
& Burt, Entry of New Carriers Into Domestic Trunkline Air Transportation, 22 J. AIR
L. & Com. 131, 154 (1955).
205. See New York-Florida Case, No. 3051, CAB, Sept. 28, 1956, p. 5 n.7 ("[A3
policy that encourages the deterioration of air service to the smaller cities . . . is com-
pletely contrary to the public interest."). See also Great Lakes-Southeast Serv. Case,
No. 2396, CAB, Sept. 30, 1958, p. 10 ("We cannot fulfill our [CAB] responsibilities for
developing a sound route structure if we subordinate that function to the preservation
of revenues for the existing carriers.") ; Airline Feeder System, Inc., 1 C.A.A. 167, 171
(1939) ; Adams, Future of Local Service Carriers-Public Service vs. Federal Subsidy,
23 J. AIR L. & Co-m. 127, 130 (1956).
In its May 1954 report to the President, the Air Coordinating Committee observed
that high-speed, long-range, nonstop operations must not be accomplished at the cost,
neglect, or substantial impairment of service to intermediate points. The Committee sug-
gested the development of appropriate aircraft for short-haul operations; assigning trunk-
lines responsibility in some instances for providing service to additional intermediate
points, and requiring that they "meet their responsibility for maintaining adequate service
to all certificated points"; and, in other situations, the development of self-sufficient area
carriers. "It is . . . necessary for the industry and the CAB to judiciously evolve the
best means of assuring adequate service to small terminal and metropolitan centers."
U:.S. PRESIDENT'S AIR COORDINATING Co ITMrEz, CIVIL Am PoLicy 12 (1954).
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APPENDIX
THE JOURNAL QUESTIONNAIR
1. How large is the population served by your airport? How large is the area in
diameter? Is the area primarily industrial, marketing, agricultural, mining or institu-
tional ?
2. How satisfactory is surface transportation to and from your city?
3. What regularly scheduled commercial airlines are presently serving your city air-
port?
4. When was service first instituted?
5. Do you feel that your city is presently receiving adequate airline service commen-
surate with its needs? If not, in what respects is it inadequate?
6. Have any of the carriers certificated to serve your city failed to initiate service?
If so, do they intend to initiate service in the near future?
7. Have any of the carriers certificated to serve your city recently decreased or
abandoned service? If so, why?
S. How cooperative have the certificated carriers been in complying with requests for
improved service?
9. Are facilities at your airport sufficient to meet potential demand for services (as
opposed to present supply of service)? Have you improvement plans underway? When
will they be completed? How will they be financed?
10. What degree of competition exists between carriers serving your area? Do you
believe it should be increased?
11. Do you feel that communities with whom you compete directly in the attraction
of tourists, new industries, new firms, and the like, receive better air service? If so, is
this discrimination justified? What steps have been taken to alleviate this condition?
12. How far is the nearest airport to your own? Do many of your residents use
another airport? Why? Has the proximity of another airport prejudiced your city in its
attempt to obtain more adequate air service?
13. In what Civil Aeronautics Board proceedings in the past has your city taken
part? What was the extent of your participation? What was the outcome?
14. In any of these proceedings, have you favored one carrier over another? If so,
for what reasons?
15. Has your city, in general, retained local or Washington counsel in proceedings
before the CAB?
16. Has your city ever retained the services of aviation consultants in presentation
of argument before the CAB?
17. To what extent have you enlisted the aid of your governor, senator or represen-
tatives? Department of Defense? Post Office? How have they participated?
18. Has your city ever considered filing a complaint against a carrier on the ground
that you were receiving legally inadequate air service? Might you do so in the future?
Responding Cities
The Yale Law Journal received replies to the Qvestionnaire from the following
seventy cities; they are listed in descending order of approximate population served by
the local airport.
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Raleigh and Durham, N.C.
Lancaster, Pa.
Springfield, Mass.
Roanoke, Va.
Evansville, Ind.
Moline, Ill.
Madison, Wis.
Corpus Christi, Tex.
Sioux City, Iowa
Winston-Salem, N.C.
Portland, Me.
Colorado Springs, Colo.
Terre Haute, Ind.
New London, Conn.
Fargo, N.D.
Tallahassee, Fla.
Topeka, Kan.
Salem, Ore.
Ogden, Utah
Las Vegas, Nev.
Frankfort, Ky.
Cheyenne, Wyo.
Muskegon, Mich.
Billings, Mont.
Grand Junction, Colo.
Concord, N.H.
Bangor, Me.
Fort Smith, Ark.
Casper, Wyo.
Tuscaloosa, Ala.
Dodge City, Kan.
Walla Walla, Wash.
Twin Falls, Idaho
Montpelier, Vt.
Jackson, Wyo.
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